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PREFACE 
The objectives of the NASA Aerospace Safety Research and Data 
Institute (ASRDI) are: 
(a) To support NASA, its contractors and the aerospace 
industry with technical information and consulting 
on safety problems. 
(b) To identify areas where safety problems and technology 
voids exist and to initiate research programs both in-
house and on contract in these problem areas. 
(c) To author and compile state-of-the-art and summary 
publications in our areas of concern. 
(d) To establish and operate a Safety Data Bank. 
In pursuing these objectives, ASRDI has assumed the responsibility 
for publishing two documents resulting from an effort initiated and 
supported by the NASA Headquarters Safety Office (DY). 
The first of these documents is: 
General Electric Co., Daytona Beach., MAnned Space Programs 
Accidents/Incidents Summaries (1963-1969~ March 1970, NASA, 
Director, Manned Space Flight Safety, NASW-410 (Safety Task), 
NASA-CR-120998. 
This document is being reprinted to fill current needs. 
The second of these documents is: 
Cranston Research Inc., Manned Space Programs Accident/ 
Incident Summaries (1970-1971~ April 1972, NASA Headquarters 
Safety Office, Charles W. Childs, Program Manager, NASW-2225, 
NASA-CR-120999. 
This is the initial printing of this report. 
iii 
Frank E. Belles 
Director of Aerospace Safety 
Research and Data Institute 
II 
FOREWORD 
This document has been compiled to update the Manned 
Space Programs accident/incident experience information pre-
sented in NASA Safety Program document, Manned Space Programs 
Accident/Incident Surrunaries~ dated March 1970. It should be 
used in conjunction with the March 1970 document to obtain 
full visibility of the ways of preventing repetition of 
accidents/incidents in future programs. 
The March 1970 docwnent is based on accidents/incidents 
experienced in the calendar years 1963 through 1969. This 
UOCl~nt is based on accident/incident experience in the 
calendar years 1970 and 1971. 
The statistical information in this document includes a 
restatement of the significant statistical information in the 
Narch 1970 Swrunariec for comparison with the new information; 
and an integration of the total information to provide statis-
tical swnmaries covering some nine (9) years of Manned Space 
Program activities. 
As with the March 1970 document, the compilation of this 
document was made possible through the understanding and support 
provided by management and safety personnel of NASA Headquarters, 
NASA Field Centers, and NASA contractors. 
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PART I, INTRODUCTION 
A. Purpose Clnd ObJecti~ 
This compilation of accident/incident infonaation relative to 
srace Dro~rams has been pi~epare(l as "a::::-t of the t.JJ.'\SA Hanned 
Space F:a~~Il"i: Sa:::ety Pro~ram. The basic documentation of this 
in:l:o;.~mation is cOJ1.:ainec, "n t!ASb Safe-ty Pl'oc;rmn 00(,' qent, 
~1anneJ Sl')oce Pro~Tra;,m Accic;ent/Inci(1ent Sur,.naries, r.larch 
1970, on exper~_el1('e tl':"'oa~:, the ec:lenc'.ar ~'ears 1963-1909. 
Thb joclunent i~ em 11~)tlate 0"- the basic (loC'ament to Gd(; 
accident/incident exoeriene:e ~ained llur:in~~ calendar /ears 
1970 and 1971. Tile oiJJertive of th11" C'ompilc:tion il'l to con-
tri0:..tte -::0 sa::-et~ :-:' ,nal~in!", ava ilahJ.e to nOVp.rn(;lellt agencies 
an .. inclu:"triDl COn~el":l:'; ~lle s.i.;;nj.:Ucant 1(':';30'15 lpal'l-,cd from 
the acc iC:eilt" / inc ic:ent e:q.)(~ r ie'1ce of ~!annel, Space Fli~~ht Pro-
grams. No re:e1'eI1l'e las uee!; :nOGC' in tile ;'lIJ11r:la:'i(!s as to 
locat:"on, facili.t.Lc3, ,~ompan:i_cs, or:,,;oilizations, pr'ol:ucts, 
pro;a-ams, or illdh illuals hwo1ve,.;. T.le (iO('I',mellt ;1a5 l)e~11 
preoal'ed priIl1Di.·il:' for i::1E" l,;oc-oi w.imw;e'';1cnt, r.t:pervisory, 
en~ineerinr.;, ant; safet~1 flcrsonnel on spacc pl'Clgra:ns. For most 
~:[fective use in IU'i.:ure programs, .1JIC indivillual accidents/ 
incidents recorticd berp.in :nust be interrn'c"ccd ~y ~ror~rar.\ speciul-
ists for applica·tio:1 to pot~ntial h.:tzarus of the particular 
pror:ram or s~'5terns involveu. 1'01' the Dssjstance of il1ana~ement 
in evaluating the poten1' ially haZa11 (1011S p:,ases of a program, 
statistical summaries of cause factor:: allt ot .er significant 
1. 
information pertaining to accident prevention in future pro-
grams has been provided. 
B. Information Sources 
The swnmaries contained herein \lIere compiled. from existing 
llOClunentation of accidents or incidents on ~lanned. Space Flir;ht 
Pro~rams. In compilin~'; the basle document, approximately 
10,000 case documents were reviEwed, from \lIhich a total of 
509 summaries tllDS selected. Records reviewed included exist .. 
in:3 rcc Ol'ds of Nl\Sl\ H('c:uquarters, N..'\S/I F iclc1 Centers concerned 
with space prosrams, anu eighteen (18) contractors, associate 
contractol~!:' and subcontractors on space programs. In cornpilillS' 
the information for this (locument, over 5000 case documents 
\'lel~e rev ie,-Ie d at Nl\Sl\ Headquarters, NASA f :telu centers, and 
five (~) major contractors, reculting in the selection of an 
ac:ditional 223 summaries. No attempt \'Jas made to E;t.ITnmarize 
anomalies "':lic~l occurreu c1urint"; manne(l space flight missions. 
Tl:e majority of the accidents/incitients selected occurred 
c.urin::::,; various phases of the Apollo Program with the rer.lainder 
selected from other manned space programs. 
C. Criteria Use0 
Each accident/incident summary contained in Part III has been 
SWlll1larfzed by description, cause and rccQl,11l1endeli preventive/ 
corrective action. The criteria used f01' each of these surnr;1ary 
sc~ments are defined below: 
1.1· 
I: 
Ii 
Ii 
II 
i1 
2. 
-. 
1. TJescr ilt.: ipn,s 
Acciden~s/incj.dentS' \·lere selected from records on the basis 
of the follOtdng criteria: 
B. l-n occur:::oe.!1ce \Jldch reflected e sir,nificant lesson of 
importa.'1ce to future ,rogramG. 
b. T;le occurrence involved space p .. 'o~rams rU.rrht vehicle 
syster,ls, hal'C\·mre o!' ~oLll1l1 suppor·' equipment an~ 
facHitieG pro\'iL:i.:-:g l .lrect sapl?or~ to ~pace ,rograms. 
c. T)e occurrence rC!sub:ed iro pe!:Gonnel fatality/inju:.'y, 
and/or ceLl~ed damage to program s;·::r!:ems, hard\~are, 
G~E and ::acil:i_ties or- resulJ.:eJ in a potentiall/ hazard-
OllS conc j:: ion. 
T-'e desc:ri9l:~on for eaC~1 e.cC'::'.-"iellt/incideni: relates l..;hat 
hap?enecl; :-i.O\"i it lIa!)peneC; t:,e ~ha3e of the pro:!r'9m £cti'litr 
involved; harc1\>}sre. eql'ipmcnt a;lci/ol." jacilities daman-ed; 
personnel in.;:1ri_e~ a,:(: ~£ltalit:i.es fncurred or 90tentinl 
hazards created. 
The llcscriptj_on ot \'1hat ;lt1.9pcner:~ has included the event that 
caused the accident/inciclent to occur. For eXafil?le, Ha gage 
blew up and iJi.-jure([ one person d1lring (,evelopment test of an 
en~ine, dlE to inadvertent cross connection of hi~ and lOt~ 
pressure sys·i:ems.': Here, the first orGel' cause factor was 
inclurleti as J1£1rt of the description of what happene~ and per-
mits concentration in the cause section on the second order 
of causes related to ,'lh",' it happenec. This 'lias done because 
3. 
it is believed l::1St too often cause factors have not been 
identified in sufficien i: depth to provide guidelines for 
management or supervisor~' corrective programs. 
2. Causes 
The causes identified in the "Cause" sections reflect the 
judgment of the reviewing teams based upon information pro-
vided in the accident/incident records. In many cases, tr.e 
repo!:'ts were supplemented cy discussions ,dth key people 
to r:lore accul.~ately identify cause factors. The second order 
cause factors consiclereu \'lere h~rd\,lare or Q,oftware ueficiencies, 
as de"!:ermined b:' the following criteria: 
a. Hal'dwBre Deficiencies 
o ~~teriBl Failure - Material :failure as used in cause 
o 
detel'millatJ~ons \'las defined as any failure of lTIaterials 
or' components in development tests at less than design 
specification or failure under operational conditions. 
Design Deficiency - T!1is cause factor was defined as 
an~' desi;;J1 specification inadequacy, resulting in 
deficient hardware \,11·;icfl contributetl to the occurrence 
of an accident/incident. Factors considered \'Jere 
omission of essential information, failure to specify 
safety clevices or warnings, failure to determine 
stress/fatigue and otller operational/interface factors, 
errors in material selection, or clerical errc:rs in 
cl.ra\'Jinr;s anLl specifica·tions. 
;,·:··1-·; 
I! . 
I, 
I: I . . 
i " ,. 
i; . 
4. 
o 
o 
Haterials Incanpatibllity - Materials incompatibility 
was defined as any cause in which incompatible 
materials were brought tozether through a design 
error, installation error, or procedural error. 
Malftmctions - Malfunctions were defined as any 
anomaly where a system, subsystem or component failed 
to function as intended, resulting in conditions 
which contributed to accidents/incidents. 
b. Software Deficiencies 
o 
o 
procedura} - A procedural deficiency was defined as 
any case in which formal procedures contributed to 
accident/incident causes as a result of failure to 
9repare procedures, failure to follow procedures, 
deviations from procedures during a test, failure to 
coordinate cmcurrent tests, omissions of essential 
information in procedures, cle:r.ical errors in pro-
cedures, use of wrong prOCeQLWeS, or failure to up-
date procedures. 
Planning - A planning deficiency was defined as any 
case w:1erc the cause of an accident/incident was due 
to failure to properly plan prior to an event. In-
cluded in these considerations were lack of or 
inadequate test planning, failure to perform pre-
operations hazard analysis, deficiencies in planning 
for transportation, handling Bnd storage. and failure 
to determine necessary equipment and personnel re-
sources for an operation. 
5. 
o 
o 
o 
o 
l'1ork Control - ~lork control deficiency was defined 
as any condition contributing to an accident/incident 
during installation, maintenance~ storage, cleaning, 
_ repair,_and fabrication of systems. Factors con-
sidered as work control deficiencies were inadequate 
records, inadequate area control, failure to exercise 
proper control over materials, failure to properly 
mark and identify equipment and failure -to define 
work requirements. 
Management/Supervisory - This cause factor was defined 
to include errors in decisions, policies, or direct-
ives which contributec1 to the occurrence of accident/ 
incidents. Included was failure to perform manage-
ment or supervisory responsibilities for planning; 
training and certifying personnel; and failure to 
perform personnel surveillance of critical activities. 
Training - This category was defined as any deficiency 
in workmanship or lluty performance in which lack of 
training, briefing~ certification or specific work 
jns·tructions contributed to an Bccident/incident. 
Inspection - All inspection deficiency was defined. as 
Bny condition contributing to an occurrence in which 
inspection was involved through failure to verify, 
failure to maintain inspection records or errors in 
inspect).on records. 
.. 
6. 
3. Recoll1l1end!,d CorrectiveL:rreventive Action 
In this part, an effort was made to reflect all recommenda-
tions included in the reports reviewed. In many cases, 
recommended corrective/preventive actions in individual 
reports were l<eyed solely to the one event t and not necess-
arily broadly applicable to other similar events. In those 
cases t the recanmended corrective actims were evaluated 
and extrapolated for application generally to like systems 
on future programs. Also, since CBllse factors were con-
sidered in terms of hardwar~ or software deficiencies, the 
recommended corrective/preventive action was generally 
oriented to tl:ese cause factors. 
PART II. STATISTICAL SUMMARY 
A. Approach 
The statistical information presented in this document is de-
signed to present graphically that information considered to 
be of value to management. The charts at the end of this Part 
show the distribution of accidents by system categories, cause 
factors and program activities. The information provided in 
these charts represents accident/incident statistical informa-
tion over an approximate nine (9) year period. In each chart, 
a bar-graph is presented to show accident/incident experience 
over: 
1. The 1963 through 1969 period (March 1970 Summary period) 
2. T:le 1970 and 1971 period (update period) 
3. The 1963 through 1971 period (total period) 
B. Findings 
By the method of display, management is provided with a basis 
for relatin~ program events to accident/incident data for the 
time periods shown. Some of the more sig-nificant infonnation 
shown in the charts is summarized belO\'J. Although the accidents/ 
incidents in the 1970-71 period generally followed the same 
distribution as the EIG3-69 period, there were some significant 
chan~es over the last two (2) years. 
1. Distribution by Systems 
Of the ten (10) system categories shown in Chart 1, Pressure 
Systems and Facilit~I/Ground Support Equipment were the two 
'I' -·-··f·.~·!··-1- ; 1 : i: ; I' , 
8. 
systems having the highest percentage involvement over 
the total period; although there was a significant de-
crease (23% to 9%) in Pressure Systerr.s involvement, and 
a significant increase 0-8% to 35%) in Facility/GroWld 
Support Systems involvement in the 1970-71 period. The 
percentage involvement over the to-cal period for these 
systems \'Jere: 
B. Facility/Grolmd Support Systems 2(t~~ 
b. Pressure Systems 19% 
Ordnance Systems continued to Shot>l the lowest involvement, 
with no recorded accident/incident in the 1970-71 period. 
2. Distribution ,by Ca~se.s 
T,le distribution of acc:dents/incidents by cause factors 
is shown in Chart 2. Software ceficiencies were a greater 
contributor to accidents/incidents than Hardware deficienci~s; 
and procedures, work control and inspect:'on were the most 
significant Software cause factors. 
a. Hardware Deficiencies 
Hardware deficiencies t'l1ere, for the most part, related 
to design deficiencies. The numb er of cases i.n which 
design deficiencies contributed to or caused accidents/ 
incidents was significantly higher than those caused 
by material failures or malfWlctions, although there 
was a Significant decrease (37% to 17%) in design de-
ficiency causes in the 1970-71 periocl. In 31% of the 
9. 
732 cases, a design deficiency was identified, whereas 
only S% of the cases .involved material failure as a 
cause and only 6% involved malfunctions. Material 
failure causes increased (3% to 8%), and malfunction 
causes decreased (8% to 1%) in the 1970-71 period. 
Cases involving malfunctions occurred mostly during 
operat ional tests and manufacturing checkout. Like-
\lise, the nU1i1ber of cases where material incompatibility 
contribu"ted to the cause of accidents/incidents was 
relatively small, only 3% of the 732 cases; however, 
sor.le very Gel'iou5 accidents occUl'red as a result of 
this factor. 
b. Software Deficiencies 
The number of cases involving procedural deficiencies 
\-1aS r:::ignifican"1:1y high and constituted the single 
largest contrihutor to accidents/incidents causes \'lith 
If9;~ of the 732 cases. Like\')ise, the number of related 
\'lori~ control lleficiencies \-1<1S quite high. This areD 
Nns a very s:i.~nificant factor :in acc:illent/incident 
causes and consti"tutell the second la!'p;est contributor 
with 3:~;'~ of C;le 732 cases. 
Nanap;ement or supel'v:isory deficiencies were involved in 
7% of the 732 cases. Six percent (6%) of the cases in-
volveCl Elannin~ deficiencies and 9% of the accidents/ 
incidents involved training deficiencies. In many 
III 
10. 
cases, training deficiencies pertained to inadequate 
ImO\lJleC:ge of the total operation. Individuals \4ere 
not \'lell enough informed of other work going on con-
currently and/or what the previous shift had done as 
shown byi:he fact that 3% of the accidents/incidents 
involved lailure to tl'ansfer essential information 
during shift chal1,qes. Although jpspecticm deficiencies 
were not the primary cause of accidents/incidents, in-
spection was a major contributing factor since many 
accidents/incidents could have been prevented hac there 
been sufficient an(l timely inspection and verification. 
For example, in 3% of the cases, there were cross 
connect isms of lines or cables which could have been 
prevented by inspection. Twenty-three percent (23~ 
of the accidents/incidents involved inspection defici-
encies. 
3. Distribution br Program Activity 
As records were reviewed, the accidents/incidents were identi-
fied to a program activity. The results of this compilation 
are shot'111 in Chart 3. As sho\'111 in the chart, more of the 732 
accidents/incidents occurred durin~ operational test and 
checkout than in any other prograr,l activity, accoWlting for 
45% of the total. Hanufacturing t'las also a Significant 
source of accidents/incidents, \'Jlth 34% of the cases occurring 
during this activity. 
11. 
4. Distribution by Accidents VB. Incidents 
The distribution of accidents/:fncidents was based on . 
NHB 1700.1 definitions (Type A, Type B, Incident) and the 
identifications in the case documents reviewed. The 
distributions are: 
Period 
1963-1969 
1970-1971 
1963-1971 
Accidents 
17% 
13% 
16% 
5. Distribution by \vork Shift 
Incidents 
83% 
87% 
84% 
The statistical summary of accidents/incidents by work 
shifts revealed a rather direct relationship to the level 
of activity or the number of people involved in each shift. 
\'lith most of the work done on the day shift, as would be 
expected, the majority of cases occurred on the first shilt. 
Alti10ugh risks may have been higher, per level of activity, 
on second and third shifts, data was not available to make 
this correlation. Distribution of cases by shift was 8S 
follows: 
Period 
1963-1969 
1970-1971 
1963-1971 
First Shift 
65% 
81% 
70% 
Second Shift 
26% 
12% 
22% 
I 
Third Shift 
go,.,.; 
7% 
8% 
12. 
6. Distribution by Calendar Quarters 
The seasonal distribution of accidents/incidents by calendar 
quarters was compiled as follows: 
1963-69 1970-71 1963-71 
First Quarter 29J6 30% 29% 
(Jan., Feb., Mar.) 
Second Quarter 2l~% 211% 24% 
(April, May. June) 
Third Quarter 27% 22% 25% 
(July, Aug., Sept.) 
Fourth Quarter 20% 24% 21% 
(Oct., Nov., Dec.) 
This distribution could not be correlated to any particular 
factor, and the variation in tiistribut ion was not enough to 
be significant. 
7. Injuries/Fatalities/Damage 
Records compiled on percentage of accidents/incidents which 
involved in juries, fatalit ies. or dan18ge shO\\led the follOt\ling: 
% OF THE TOTAL 
1%3-69 1970-71 1963-71 
Injuries 15~~ 20% 17% 
Fatalit ies 1°' loJ ~ 1% 1°' 10 
Damage (hardware, .facilities, 68% 66% 67% 
equipment) 
In a number of the cases, personnel injury or fatality, as 
well as damage, occurred. A nlmWer of incidents were included 
in the summaries where there were no injuries. fatalities, or 
damage, but the incident created a high hazard potential. For 
13. 
these reasons, the percentages shown do not cumulatively 
represent all the accidents/incidents summarized. 
8. Human Error 
Separate emphasis was not given to human error in identify-
ing cause factors unless it was apparent in a report, be-
cause human error would be present to some degree in most 
unplanned events. Emphasis was placed, however, upon 
determing what caused or contributed to the human error 
and, as the accident/incident recordS were reviewed, a 
notation was made as to whether or not human error was 
directly involved in the cause of the accident. Based upon 
a simple ~ or ~ determination of direct or indirect human 
error involvement, the following percentages of cases in-
volved human error as a factor to the cause of accidents/ 
jncidents. The majority of these cases involved second-
order causes. Human error involvement could probably have 
been identified in the rema inder of the cases had more in-
formation been available: 
1963-61) 
1970-71 
1963-71 
72% 
73% 
The f ollow:ing percentages of cases, where an :indiv iuual act 
of carelessness or irresponsibility at the time of the 
occurrence \vBS the only cause, \-Jere identified: 
III 
]4. 
1963-69 
1970-71 
1963-71 
<1% 
~fo 
"'" 3% 
In practically all the cases there were indications that 
management and supervisory deficiencies were indirectly 
involved in accident/incident causes even though deficiencies 
were not specifically identified in the reports and documents 
reviewed. 
15. 
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CHART 2 - DISTRIBUTION OF ACCIDENT/INCIDENTS BY CAUSES 
Note: Several Cause Factors Could Be Involved in the Same Accident/Incident 
I-' 
en 
...-f 
«! 
+> 
~ 
fo-4 
o 
~ 
5 
4 
3 
2 
1 
- 47 OPERATIONAL TEST & CHECKOUT 
_ 43 MANUF ACTURING 
DESIGN & DEVELOPMENT 
_12 TEST 
-Un-ll 9 .-10 INSTALLATION, 
MAINTENANCE 
- 6 
PROGRAM ACTIVITY 
NOTES: 
1. Design and development tests are 
those cases in which an unplanned 
event occurred during Qualification 
or Development testing. 
2. Manufacturing includes those cases 
involving functional checkout of 
systems, subsystems or components. 
3. Installation and maintenance includes 
all cases occurring during installation 
and maintenance o,f facilities, systems, 
GSE or flight systems. 
4. and checkout includes 
mbled vehicles and all 
sites, including 
tests and pre-launch 
c:J 1963-69 Distribution 
~ 1970-71 Distribution 
III 1963-71 Distribution 
CHART 3 - DISTRIBUTION OF ACCIDENT/INCIDENT BY PROGRAM ACTIVITY 
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50. 
51. 
AccIdent/Incident 
DescrIption 
During LOX tanking from 
barge-mounted storage 
tanks, the replenish 
pump on the barge caught 
fire internally and ex-
ploded, resulting in 
a fire and damage to thp. 
barge and adjacent barge 
and dock area. 
During planned LOX 
discharge from a storage 
tank into a drainage 
ditch ~hree automobiles 
in the area caught fire 
and were destroyed. One 
driver narrowly escaped 
severe injury. 
SECTION I 
CRYOGENIC SYSTEMS 
Causes 
Failure of monitoring 
personnel to note and report 
abnormally low pump radial 
bearing temperature. Con-
tri b1lting were material 
failure in that the pump 
shaft thrust bearing failed 
due ~o an oil BE'al lle.ak at 
50 psi pressure; and in-
adequate design in 1-javing 
no automatic slg~al to warn 
of abnormal pump condl~lonB. 
Personnel error in th~t PM-
ployees who were handling the 
rOlld block operations, during 
the LOX discharge, drove llutos 
into an area where LOX vapor 
clouds were present. Contri-
buting we~ inadequate controls 
and procedures governing move-
ment or activity in areas where 
LOX vapor clouds c~ be ~tici­
pated. 
Recommended 
PreventIve/CorrectIve 
ActIon 
Designate all LOX handling 
operations as hazardous 
and require training and 
certification of all personnel. 
Require use of welded 
stainless steel oil seala 
rated at 150 psi for LOX 
pump applications. Require 
all LOX-handling equipment 
monitoring instrumentation to 
pro vide automatic warning 
of abnormal operating 
temperatures. 
Designate LOX discharge 
operations as hazardous and 
require s~ety inspection 
~d approval prior to any 
discharge. Ensure the 
placement of area caution and 
warning devices prior to 
LOX discharge operations 
and/or institute positive 
traffic control procedures 
'lround LOX discharge areas. 
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Aooident/Inoident 
Description 
52. While a H2 sample W'3.S 
being prepared for 
analysis on~ of two 
cryogenic sample co:t1e 
discs ruptured and :ne 
gas ignited, injuring 
one employee. 
53. During manufacture check-
out of a spacecraft 
cryogenic shelf, metallic 
chips were detected in 
the c,ryogenic disconnec~ 
and in the ground half 
pressure operated discon-
nect (POD) of tank 2 
vent line. Chips also 
were found in tank 1. 
SECTION I 
CRYOGENIC SYSTEMS 
Causes 
A mat~ria1 deficiency in 
that the disc was extensive-
ly corroded and failed under 
working gas !)ressure. Con-
tributing causes were inade-
quate quality control which 
failed to detect the corroded 
disc, and a test set-up which 
aimed the disc end of the 
cottle toward technicians. 
Inadequate work control in 
that cryogenic vent lines 
were not properly cleaned 
after trimming as required. 
Contributing was QC failure 
to detect the contaminated 
parts. 
Reoommended 
Preventive/Corrective 
Aotion 
Ensure periodic inspection 
and certification of all 
cryogenic sample bottles. 
Ensure that test equipment 
configuratlons pro'fide 
adequate protection to 
personnel from hazards of 
pressurized sample bottles. 
Ensure that personnel are 
trained and certified for 
their job. Require strict 
QC during each step of the 
cryogenic system assembly 
and installation, , 
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ACCident/Inc1dent. 
De scrl,pt10n 
52. During operational test-
ing and checkout of a 
spacecraft vacuum pump 
electrical unit, 28 volt 
circuitry was subjected 
to 115 volt main supply 
due to cross connections 
and sustained irreparable 
d9.Illage to several ci!'cuit 
components. 
53. While a set of nickle-
cadmium tatteries was 
undergoing trickle 
charge in the course of 
a charge-discharge cycle, 
one of the cells shorted, 
overheated and caught 
fire. 
SECTION II 
ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS 
Causes 
Inadequate quality co~trol 
during m~,ufacture of the 
unit in that the wiring 
harness of the unit had 
been erroneously assembled 
and permitted 115 volts 
supply to flow into circuits 
designed to accept only 
28 volts. 
Deficient battery conctitlon-
ing procedures in that the 
charge-discharge cy~les 
used were too severe for the 
batteries being employed. 
Recommended 
Preventive/Corrective 
Action 
Require development and 
use of circuits continuity 
checkout procedures for 
post-assembly verification 
of electri~al units. 
Ensure that such procedures 
recei-/e review and con-
currence by corr.petent 
englneering authority. 
Designate battery condition-
ing operations as hazardous. 
Require safety review/ 
analysis of condltioning 
procedures to ensure pro-
cedures compatibility with 
the batteries being process-
ed. 
I\) 
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54. 
55. 
Accident/Incident 
Description 
During a training 
flight, a space flig~t 
training vehicle :os~ 
i':,8 primary electrical 
system and crashed 
when the a~titude control 
system (ACS) failed. 
The vehicle was destroy-
ed and :r.e pilot receiv-
ed minor injuries 
during ej~ction. 
\vhile performing PM on 
an electric main breaker 
panel, a workman using a 
wire brush to clean inside 
the panel made contact 
with energized stabs, 
receiving second and third 
degree burns. 
SECTION II 
ELECTRICl\L SYSTEMS 
Causes 
A design defici~ncy 1~ that 
the ACS could not be ~witched 
fro:;] prir.tary 1;0 emergency 
electrical power with the 
e:!gine at fligtt RPrlT. Con-
trIbuting causes were in-
adequate check-ou+ pro-
cedur~s which failed to 
lrerify emergency swi tchover 
functions at engine flight 
RPrlT, and ':h~ n,:;ed for multiple 
relays ~o operate sImultaneous-
ly to switch in emergency ACS. 
Failure to follow required 
procedures in that the pan31 
was not de-energized prior to 
ceginning maintenance opera-
tions. Contributing ~as the 
use of i,mproper equipment; 
wire brushes were prohibited 
for cleaning electrical 
system components. Also, 
inadequate training in that 
the workman incorrectly used 
a test instrument to verify 
the panel was de-energized. 
Recommended 
Preventive/Corrective 
Action 
During design of complex 
flight systems ensure 
that hazard analyses are 
performed on all electrical 
circuits controlling switch 
OV0r from one system to 
another to determine. integrity 
of relays under all power 
settings. Require all flight 
control systems to be tested 
and certified for actual 
flight conditions. 
Ensure positive verification 
of circuit deactivation prior 
to allowing electrical work. 
Ensure that all tools used with 
electrical consoles are non-
conductive or are specifically 
certified for use. Require 
training of all personnel as-
signed to work on electrical 
systems. 
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56. 
57. 
Accident/Incident 
Description 
During a m~nuf~cturing 
checkout of a spacecraft 
module caution-and-warn-
ing system power supply 
unit~ a signal input 
lead was disconnected 
from the test oscillo-
scope, as part of the 
test sequence, and was 
accidentally grounded, 
causing an arc and ·burn-
ing the C&W power supply. 
During assembly elec-
tric~l insulation 
resistance test of 
cables installed on a 
flight unit, a power 
supply and two control 
accelerometers were 
severly damaged due to 
the application of 
reverse polarity. 
SECTION II 
ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS 
Causes 
Test set-up design de-
ficiency in that the test 
lead between the oscilloscope 
and the power supply unit 
contained no over-current 
protective devices. Contrib-
uting was personnel error in 
that the oscilloscope was 
connected with its chassis 
ungrounded and electrically 
"hot"; and procedural de-
ficiency since no detailed 
circuit hoo~ up instructions 
were provided the technicians 
performing the work. 
Inadequate procedures in th~t 
the inspection verification of 
the set-up configuration prior 
to test was incomplete. Con-
tributing was human error in 
misreading test set-up engineer-
ing drawings during test set-
uP. 
Recommended 
Preventive/Corrective 
Action 
Require that circuit-pro-
tective current-limiting de-
vices be installed in test 
leads used on spacecraft 
electrical systems. Ensure 
that technicians used to 
test flight systems are 
trained and certified for 
the work. Require the use 
of formal procedures and 
checklists with QC verifica-
tion in making test set-ups. 
Require formal QC inspection 
verification of test 
configurations prior to 
initiating test of critical 
components. ' 
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Accident/Incident 
Description 
58. During assembly cell-
matc,ing sequence test 
on a number o~ flight 
batteries, a battery 
cell explosion occurred, 
due to excessive internal 
pressure generated b:,r 
major cell overcharge/ 
over-temperature, result-
ing in minor damage to 
test equipment and the 
test ~acility,and des-
truction of the battery. 
59. During battery charging 
in a launch operations 
battery shop, a battery 
ce 11 overheated .and 
ruptured destroying the 
battery. 
60. During manufacturing 
assembly of an electrical 
wiring harness for a 
spacecraft, the harness 
cover pressed a deep 
indentation into a wire 
bundle cover, necessitat-
ing replacement of the 
bundle cover. 
SECTION II 
ELECTRICAL SYSTEfiIS 
Causes 
Deficient test assembly 
procedures in that verifica-
tion of the proper test 
set-up was not made prior 
to test initiation. An 
installation error in 
assembling the test set-up 
was made which inhibited 
automatic test shut down 
when battery over-tempera-
ture was encountered. Con-
tributing cause was failure 
to communicate test informa-
tion (over-temperature 
conditions) during shift 
change. 
Inadequate inspection pro-
cedures in that a weak 
cell had gone undetected, and 
it overheated at standard 
charge rate. 
Inadequate work control in 
that there was improper 
storage of wire harness whe~ 
the harness cover was install-
ed. 
,,' 
Recom.'nended 
Preventive/Corrective 
Action 
Require QC inspection 
and verification of orooer 
test configuration prior to 
initia~ion of cell sequenc-
ing tests. Establish pro-
cedures/checklists for transfer 
of essential test information 
at shift changes. 
Require inspection and 
test of battery cells for 
cell condition qefore 
start.1ng charging cycle. 
Ensure that procedures 
for electrical harness 
cable assembly include 
a cautionary note to 
verify proper storage of 
wire harness before 
installing cover. 
I'\) 
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61. 
62. 
Accident/Incident 
Descript10n 
During nickle cadmium 
batte~T condi tioning 
at a test facility, a 
cell overheata1 re-
sulting in emission 
of s~oke and fumes and 
necessitat!ng area 
evacuat.ion. 'The battery 
had to be rp.pl~ced. 
Duri:1.g manufacturing 
checkout of an 02H2 
burner sparks 
system, 3. sr.ort 
occurred on one burner 
spark circuit, resu1~­
lng in excessive 
current to the circuit 
and burnout of the 
spark exciter and 
ancillary circuitry. 
SECTION II 
ELECTRICAL" SYSTEMS 
Causes 
Material f3.ilure in that 
the batte~f failed ~nternal­
ly while under normal 
charge cordi~ior8. 
Personnel p.rror i:1. that 
t!1e connector to the sp3.rk 
exciter had been 3.sse~blad 
with a misallgned pin, 
whi~:1 shorted to the connect-
or sr.ell; and i~~dequ3.te 
monitoring o~ meter p~els 
in ~he ~est control cen~er 
during the trial run. 
Reconunended 
Preventive/Corrective 
Act10n 
Designate bat~ery 
conditioning areas and 
operations as hazardous 
and ensure that all area 
personnel are instructed 
in emergency evacuation 
procedures. 
Req~ire QC certification 
~fter assembly or installa-
tion of electrical com-
ponents or flight hardware 
circuitry. Establish 
procei'l.'res for megger- pre-
1:.est':;'ng hig~ 'TO ltage r:ircuit 
sections for potential 
gro~nding. Ass~re that 
control center monitoring 
procedures during test 
runs are adequate. 
Where possible, equip 
sa:l~ty critic3.l or operational-
ly critical meters with 
overcurrent alarms. 
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Accident/Incident 
Description 
63. ;)uring manufacturing 
assembly of ~ space-
craft, an engln~ 
gl~:al electrical switch 
toggle was broken off 
its pa.'1e 1 d'-le to an 
unknown in:pac t • 
64. During c.ertificat10n 
testing of a power 
supp 1:,.' unit, th ~ unit 
and a l~lnch vehicle 
data '3.dapter teing 
used in the test were 
damaged due to an 
electrical fal;lt. 
65. DUring acceptance test-
L1.g of a command de-
ceder unit, 'ehe unit 
was damaged when it 
was electrically shorted 
between terminals of a 
digital voltmeter being 
'lsed to conduct the 
test. 
SECTION II 
ELECTRICAL SYSTID~S 
Causes 
In."l.d~quate assembly pro-
ced~lre" in that protectl'fe 
covers for the switch 
toggles were not provide0. 
Ii'ai l'..t:"e to fo 1101.01 required 
procedures in that test 
sP.t-up cables wer~ modifIed 
to accommodate test conditions 
witho'--lt engine~ring appro fal 
and ¥ithout inspection, re-
sulting in misconnection of 
test pcwer. 
Inadequate test procedures 
in that the shorting link 
between the voltmeter ter-
~inals was not removed prior 
to proceeding with the test. 
Recommended 
Preventive/Corrective 
Action 
Require use of protective 
covers/caps for fllght 
electrical eqUipment 
dl~r::"ng assembl,Y to avoid 
in'3.dvertent damage. 
Require that all rr.odifi-::a-
tions of test set-up 
configurations and tp.st 
procedures which involve 
critical ],ardware te approved 
by competent ensineering 
authority. Require QC in-
spection of appro'led test 
eqUipment changes prior to 
testing. 
Require formal procedures 
and checklists to verif:: 
proper test set-up conditions 
prior to beginninb test. 
Conduct hazard ~~alyses or 
tes~ procedures to identify 
a..'1d prevent pot:mtlally 
hazardous e7ents. 
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66. 
67. 
Accident/Incident 
Description 
During vibration test-
ing of a launch vehicle 
digital computer (LVDC), 
the LVDC was excessively 
vibrated due to incorrect 
mounting location of a 
test control accelero-
meter, resulting in 
damage to the LVDC. 
While sp~cecraft systems 
were being tested in an 
assembly and checkout 
facility, output voltage 
on the 28 VDC test power 
s-Jpply rose to approximate-
ly 50 VD~, sutjecting 
the 8pacecr~ft MN bus A 
and E to a voltage level 
of approxlmately 45 VDC 
for 43 seconds. 
SECTION II 
~LECTRICAL SYSTEMS 
Causes 
Deficient design of test 
set-up i~ that the mounting 
location of the control 
accelerometer on the test 
fixture was not identified 
with any markings or refer-
ence designation, and there 
was an additional unmarked 
and unused mounting hole on 
the fixture. 
Random material failure, 
since a transistor in the 
power supply regulator 
circuitry failed. Contribut-
ing was the lack of over-
voltage sensing and protecting 
circuitry which would shut 
down the power supply in the 
event of an over-voltage 
condition. 
Recommended 
Preventive/Corrective 
Action 
Designate vibration test-
ing of flight equipment 
as safety cr'itical. Ensure 
that s.et-up drawings pro-
vide posit1ve 1dentif1'cation 
of mounting location of test 
hardware. Requ1re QC 
inspection and approval of 
test conf1gurations pr10r 
to test. 
Prov1deover-voltage 
sensors in electrical test 
set-ups wh1ch will cause 
the output of the power 
supply to be interrupted 
if the output voltage 
reaches established limits 
at any time. 
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Accident/Incident 
Description 
68. A technician crawled 
under a cathode ray 
tu~e unit at a test 
facility to perform 
routine adjustments 
with the power on 
and his shoulder 
came into contact 
with a 14 KV terminal 
and received an 
electrical shock. 
69. During work on a 28v 
power supply a 
technician's metal 
watch bank shorted 
out against an electri-
cal terminal and 
burned his wrist. 
SECTION II 
ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS 
Causes 
Personnel error in not shut-
ing off power prior to work. 
Contrib~ting were lack of 
procedures for specifyl!1g 
conditions for work perfor-
mance and a design deficien-
cy in that adjustment 
controls were not easily 
accessible. 
Personnel error in wearing 
a metal watch band while 
working or. an energized 
circuit. 
Reconunended 
Preventive/Corrective 
Action 
Ensure that for all high 
capa~ity electrical units, 
procedures are established 
specifyi!1g safety require-
ments for maintenance and 
operation. Ensure that 
adjustment controls are 
placed in ~cceseible locatio~s. 
Ensure that personnel 
working on energized 
circuits do not wear 
metal watch bands, brace-
lets or other objects which 
can inadvertentl~' come into 
contact with power sources. 
Ensure that hazards and 
safety precautions in 
working on energized cir-
cuits are adequately 
covered in tra.1ning courses. 
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Accident/Incident 
Description 
70. While doing work in an 
ordnance storage facility 
a workman plugged a 
portable power saw into 
an extension cordmd 
recei~ed minor electrical 
burns when se-v'ere arcing 
occurr'ed. 
71. During test operations 
at a test facility a 
power S'IlPP ly pane 1 
being inserted into a 
pan~l ::>ack on ~ test, 
set cont~cted a 11C~A~ 
circuit breaker termlnal 
in an adjacent p~n~l 
~~d sustained minor arc 
d~~age. Circuit breaker 
action prevent~d major 
damage. 
SECTION II 
ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS 
Causes 
Personnel error in that the 
wor!cinan failed t.o insp~ct and 
maintain his equipment prop~r­
ly, Since a ~et screw was 
missing from the male plug, 
causing a short circuit md 
arcing. 
Improper handling in which 
~he technicians allowed 
the pan~l to tip out of 
position. Contrjbuting 
was procedural in that rack 
power was not switched off 
prior to lr.itiatlon of 
installa~ion work. 
Reconunended 
Preventive/Corrective 
Action 
Ensure that procedures provide 
for inspection of electrical 
plugs and connections prior 
to issue and use of electrical 
hand tools. Require safety 
certification of electrical 
hand tools to be used in ord-
nance and flammable material 
storage areas. 
Ensure that electronic 
technicians are trained 
in proper equipment handling 
proc~dures and certified 
for their job. Ensure that 
work procedures specify 
turning off rack electrical 
power prior to inserting 
additional units in panel 
racks. 
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Accident/Incident 
Description 
72. During an electric~l 
"trouble" test in a 
test support facility, 
a technician receiv~d 
electrical burns on 
cot·h hands while 
handling a 480v, 3 
phase cable and 
receptacle. 
73. During routine on-
site maintenance a 
technician was blow-
ing corrosion from 
the top of a bank of 
electrical storage 
batteries with an 
air hose when the air 
stream entered a 
battery wall via 
a vent and blew 
caustic alkaline so-
lution into his eyes. 
SECTION II 
ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS 
Causes 
Y.aterial failure in that 
the receptacle had an 
electrical short. 
Inadequate maintenace pro-
cedures. The technician had 
:0 use unregulated air of 
60 psi which created suffi-
cient internal pressure in 
·the battery to spray the 
solution out. Contributing 
was personnel error in that 
the technician was not 
wearing eye protection 
eqUipment. 
Recommended 
Preventive/Corrective 
Action 
Require low vol'c9.ge 
continuity cHeck of high 
'/oltage cables/receptacles 
prior to applying load 
during maintena~ce or 
"trouble" testing. 
Forbid the use of 
air over 15 psi pressure 
for battery corrosion clean-
ing. Supply pressure 
regulators for all air 
hoses used in battery 
maintenance operations. 
Ensure that eye protection 
equipment js available 
and its use enrorced at 
field sites as well as in 
shops. 
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Accident/Incident 
Description 
74. Seventeen of 27 nickel-
cadmium batteries in 
an unattended emergency 
lighting cabinet in a 
facility mechanical 
equipment room were 
ruptured, due to in-
ternal ol/:erpr~ssure 
or externally ignit-
ed hydrogen explosion, 
resulting in blowing 
the door of'f' the 
cabinet and streWing 
pieces of plastiC cell 
case over the f'acility 
floor. It was evident 
that an explosion of 
considerable magnitude 
had occurred without 
smoke 01' soot depOSits. 
SECTION II 
ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS 
Causes 
The exact cause of the 
explosion is unknown. 
Probable cause was in-
adequate maintenance pro-
cedures/techniques which 
allowed a contaminated 
electrolyte chemical 
reaction to plug battery 
vent caps, permitting a 
hydrogen pressure ~uild­
uP. Another possible 
cause was deficient op-
erating procedures which 
failed to recognize the 
possibility of an 
accumulation of hydrogen 
gas in a confined area 
which could be ignited 
by a spark. 
Recommended 
Preventive/Corrective 
Action 
Ensure that facility 
maintenance personnel are 
instructed in the procedures/ 
techniques necessary to 
prevent contamination of 
battery electrolyte in 
emergency lighting systems. 
Require inspection of 
battery vent caps for 
plugging at each service 
interval. Require positive 
circulation of ambient air 
around battery areas in 
facility emergency 
lighting systems. 
! 
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75. 
76. 
Accident/InCident 
Description 
In a test laboratory, 
tr.e wet cell battery 
of a wall mounted 
emergency light ex-
ploded, sending a 
spray of acid into a 
hallway, which at the 
time contained no 
people. No injuries. 
During normal opera-
tions of an environment-
al simulation laboratory, 
outdoor swi tcn gear 
circuits triggered an 
explosion in their en-
closure, resulting in 
extensive damage to the 
switch gear, transformer 
and electrical cables. 
SECTION II 
ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS 
Causes 
Maintenance had. inadvertently 
replaced vented battery caps 
with a non-vented type. During 
automatic "trickle charge" the 
battery could not vent the 
hydrogen produced and exploded. 
Defective electrical cables 
provided an ignition source 
and triggered explosion of 
unexplained accumulation of 
gas in the area. Contribut-
ing was inadequate inspect.lon 
of electric cables and lack 
of a hazard analysis to 
determine potential gas 
accumulation in the syste~. 
Recommended 
Preventive/Corrective 
Action 
Ensure that maintenance 
procedures for wet cell 
batteries preclude in-
advertent substitution of 
non-vented caps. Ensure 
that personnel handling 
servicing and maintenance 
of wet cell batteries are 
trained. 
Ensure that a hazard analysis 
is performed on any e~closed 
electrical control system 
for the possibility of gas 
accumulations. Establish 
preventive maintenance and 
inspection proced'.lres for 
checking condition of 
electrical power cabJ.es in 
switch gear installations. 
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78. 
Accident/Incident 
Description 
During operation of 
an electric bridge 
crane ~t a vehicle 
stage manufacturing 
facility, an electricaJ 
fire occurred at the 
plug-in unit serving 
the crane causing 
minor damage to the 
unit. 
During routine mainten-
ance in a test l~boratory, 
a technician attempted to 
close a circuit breaker, 
the "bat" llandle of 
which had broken off, 
by inserting the tip of 
a ball point pen into a 
hole in the remaining 
portion of handle for le-
verage. When the circuit 
breaker closed, a fl~sh 
occurred and the ball 
point pen diSintegrated. 
SECTION II 
ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS 
Causes 
Malfunction. !nadequat~ 
contact of spring lo~ded 
plug pins wl~h plug-in unit 
bue bar ca'lsed over-heating 
and fire. FO-.lr over-current 
protective devices failed 
to operate. Contributing 
were :nainten9.nce policies 
which did no~ ~all for 
periodic inspection/adjust-
ment of contact mechanisms 
or over-current protective 
devices. 
Ina1equate laboratory 
operation/maintenance pro-
cedures in that the defec'::ive 
switch handle had not been 
"red-tagged" to prevent 
operation. Contributing was 
personnel error in tr.at the 
technician attempted to 
manipulate defectIve electrical 
hardware. 
Recommended 
Preventive/Corrective 
Action 
Establish maintenance ~~d 
calibr~tion/inBpection 
schedules for electrical 
plug-in units and over-
c,'rrent protective de7ices 
used on equipment ha-~dling 
end item hardware. Ensure 
that maintenance schedules 
require checking the 
adju~tment of electrical 
contact points ~d the time 
current characteristics 
of over-current protectl-ve 
devices. 
Ensure that laboratory 
operating/maintenance pro-
cedures prOvide for timely 
"red-tagging" and reporting 
of defective laboratory 
electrical equipment, and pro-
hibit use/0peration of such 
ha~dware until repair is made. 
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Accident/Incident 
Description 
79. During routine facility 
maintenance of an auto-
matic charger battery 
system, 6 of 27 nickel-
cadmium batteries being 
reinstalled exploded, 
resulting in mild 
chemical burns to two 
workmen. 
SECTION II 
ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS 
Causes 
Inadequate work procedures 
in that a probable cause was 
ignition of accumulated 
hydrogen gas by a spark 
generated during the re-
placement work, and inadequate 
ventilation of the battery 
area; a second probable 
cause was stopped up vent 
caps, resulting from 
contaminated electrolyte, 
which permitted hydrogen 
pressure build-up to an 
explosive force in the 6 
batteries. 
Recommended 
Preventive/Corrective 
Action 
Require positive circul~­
tion of ambient air around 
battery areas during 
maintenance/servicing of 
batteries. Require 
verification of battery 
vent cap openings prior 
to initiating maintenance/ 
servicing 1n battery areas. 
Ensure that maintenance 
personnel are adequately 
instructed in the procedures 
necessary to prevent con-
tamination of battery electro-
lyte. 
w 
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95. 
96. 
Accident/Incident 
Description 
During inspection of 
facilities' fire de-
tection systems at a 
NASA center, several 
"fixed temperature/ 
rate of rise" fire 
detectors were found de-
fective in the "rat'e 
ofri.se" mode. 
During welding opera-
tions of a launch 
facility structure on 
the upper level, slag 
fell to a lower level, 
striking a workman. 
No injury resulted, 
although the potential 
for such was present. 
SECTION III 
FACILITY/aSE SYSTEMS 
Causes 
Material failure because a 
crack or other defect in 
the detector pressure tight 
dome prevents necessary 
pressure build-up from heat 
exposure which activates the 
alarm. 
Failure to exercise 
reasonable safety precautions, 
in that protective devices 
were not used. 
Recommended 
Preventive/Corrective 
Action 
Establish periodic 'inspection 
and replacement" schedules 
for automatic fire detection 
equipment at all facilities. 
DeSignate all welding 
operations on launch facility 
structure as hazardous 
and require safety inspec-
tion prior to commenCing 
operations. Enforce use 
of protective measures to 
control sparks, spatter, 
and dr1pping slag during 
welding operations. 
w 
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Accident/Incident 
Description 
While undergoing con-
tingency crew fire train-
ing under live fire 
conditions, 3 men re-
ceived minor injuries 
when the portable 
extinguishers used 
malfunctioned and 
the trainees panicked 
and ran from the train-
ing area. 
98. During heat curing of 
materials in a 5000 F. 
rated environmental 
chamber, the materials 
were decomposed and the 
chamber damaged due to 
an excessive rise (to 
approximately 1000° F.) 
in chamber temperature. 
SECTION III 
FACILITY/GSE SYSTEMS 
Causes 
Failure to properly in-
spect and maintain ex-
tinguishers, since 
chemicals had formed and 
. lodged in discharge hose, 
making extinguishers in-
operative. Contributing 
were failure to familiar-
·ize trainees with escape 
routes prior to beginning 
operations and the use 
of a fire much larger 
than needed on a windy 
day. 
Failure to follow approved 
procedures in that the 
temperature sensing and con-
trol system was improperly 
set when the chamber was 
readied for operations. 
Contributing were a material 
failure and a design de-
ficiency; a chamber pressure 
bleed line had failed and 
the chamber temperature 
control system was so de-
signed that it was dependent 
on proper operation of the 
chamber pressure system to 
provide over-temperat~re 
shutdown. 
Recommended 
Preventive/Corrective 
Action 
Require ~ormal procedure~, 
for cleaning, inspection and 
maintenance of extingui~hers, 
including inspection for 
blocked discharge hoses. 
Require "dI-y-run" of trainees 
prior to exposure to 
simulated fire fighting 
conditions. Ensure that 
wind factors are considered 
when determining size of 
training fire to be used. 
Require the use of formal 
procedures and checkists 
in preparing test chambers 
for operation. Ensure that 
test chamber temperature 
sensing and control systems. 
are independent of the 
proper operation of other 
systems, or provide fail-
safe features. 
LU 
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Accident/Incident 
Description 
99. Approximately ten 
minutes after a weld-
ing crew at a test 
site construction 
operation had quit 
work for the day. '3. 
fire occurred as a 
result of hot slag 
wedged between a 
scaffold bO'3.rd and 
tarpaulin wind break. 
100. During inspection '3.nd 
recovery of a sample 
in an X-ray spectro-
meter, a trained '3.nd 
qualified technician 
bypassed the safety 
interlocks and removed 
a shield to recover 
a spilled sample and 
was exposed to X-ray 
radiation. 
SECTION III 
FACILITY/GSE SYSTEMS 
Causes 
Inadequate work control 
procedures in that an 
asbestos fire blanket 
was not in place during 
the welding operations. 
Oontributing was failure 
to inspect work area 
prior to leaving. 
Failure to follow estatlish-
ed procedures for handling 
samples in the spectrometer. 
Contributing were a design 
deficiency in that the 
spectrometer lacked '3.dequate 
positive safety interlocks to 
ensure de-activation of the 
x-ray high voltage power 
source when the shield was 
removed, and a lack of 
hazardous condition warning 
devices. 
Recommended 
Preventive/Corrective 
Action 
Ensure that work control 
procedures enforce use 
of barriers/asbestos 
blankets during welding 
operations; require at 
least a one hour fire 
watch following end of 
welding operations. 
Require tha~ all x-ray 
spectrometry be deSignated 
as hazardous. Provide 
safety interlocks that will 
turn off the x-ray power 
supply when the shield is re~ 
moved. Ensure that all areas 
where x-ray eqUipment is being 
used are designated and 
placarded as hazardous. 
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Accident/Incident 
Description 
101. While cutting a steel 
plate near an unused 
LN tank, during manu-
fagturing operations, 
sparks from the cutting 
torch fell on the tank 
insulation causing it 
to ignit~ and resulting 
in a small fire. 
102. During the proof load-
testing of a manu-
facturer's 10 ton bridge 
crane, a control panel 
door loosened and 
fell 40 ft. to the 
floor. 
103. While moving a work-
stand being used during 
the assembly ,and checkout 
of a flight module, a 
handrail struck an 
antenna guard cover on an 
adjacent module causing 
minor damage to the cover. 
SECTION III 
FACILITY/GSE SYSTEMS 
Causes 
Inadequate work control 
and failure to follOW 
established'procedures and 
safety precautions, in that 
operation was started l'rith-
out required approval of 
supervision and fire de-
partment verification. 
Inadequate inspection/ 
maintenance procedures in 
that the holes for #4-
counter sunk screws had 
enlarged and could no 
longer ho Id the door 
hinge in place. 
Inadequate work control 
which permitted moving 
the work stand without 
assistance and assurance 
that,proper clearance from 
flight hardware articles 
could be maintained. 
Recommended 
Preventive/Corrective 
Action 
Designate all welding 
operations around LN? tanks 
as hazardous. Require 
safety/fire department 
inspection and verification 
befor'e welding starts. 
Require use of protective 
shields or blanketing. 
Require maintenance in-
spection of counter.sunk 
screws and screw holes 
for looseness or wear on 
overhea,d handling eqUipment 
being used with critical pro-
gram hardware. Where possible, 
replace. screws with bolts 
and lock nuts. 
Require the use of at 
least one observer to 
verify clearances during 
movement of workstands 
in program manufacturing! 
assembly areas. 
W 
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Accident/Incident 
Description 
104. During manufacturjng 
welding operations on 
an engine instrumenta-
tion line, a high 
frequency arc punched 
through the insulation 
of the welding head 
cable and burned a 
hole approximately 
3/16 inch in diameter 
in the engine cross-
over duct bellows. 
105. During maintenance of 
a space engine manu-
facturing facility 
air conditioning unit, 
a solenoid valve blew 
up while being sweated 
off a unit freon line, 
causing minor injury to 
two workmen. 
SECTION III 
PACILITY/aSE SYSTEMS 
Causes 
Inadequate pre-welding 
inspection procedures, since 
inspection of the failed 
cable suggests several 
strands were cut or broken 
prior to initiation-of the 
arc. Contributing was 
personnel failure to main-
tain required cable 
clearances from conductive 
surfaces. 
Personnel error. The freon 
line had not been cut, as 
required, to relieve gas 
pressure prior to applying 
heat. 
Recommended 
Preventive/Corrective 
ActIon 
Require pre-welding QC 
inspection and certification 
of electriC arc welding 
cables prior to use on 
program essential equipment. 
Inspect for unacceptable 
insulation cuts, knicks and 
abrasions; prevent welding 
cables from touching 
conductive surfaces during 
welding. Ensur~ that 
welding personnel are 
t.rained and certified for 
safe conduct of the work. 
DeSignate all welding, 
torch cutting and heat 
sweating operations on 
essential facility air-
conditioning o~ refrigerat-
ing equipment as ha-
zardous and require training 
and certification of workmen 
for their Job. Require use 
of checklist procedures 
when such work is performed in 
vicinity of flight hardware. 
~ 
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Accident/Incident 
Description 
106. During a m~~ufacturlng 
functional check of the 
ladder/catwalk assembly 
for horizontal tank 
in~erlor operations, the 
winch which deploys ~d 
stows the assembly fai~ed, 
allowing the assembly to 
drop uncontrollably to 
its deployed position. 
Damage consisted of 
';:)roken cables and fittings 
on the assemcly. There 
were no injuries. 
107. While a spacecraft was 
mounted on a workst~d 
during parts installation 
a VHF in-flight antenna 
was damaged in an unknown 
manner several hours 
after having been in-
stalled. 
SECTION III 
FACILITY/aBE SYSTEMS 
Causes 
Inadequate tool inspe~tlon/ 
m~in~enance procedures in 
that the manually operated 
winch, which had a mal-
functioning safety lock and 
a loose drive handle, had not 
teen removed from service. 
Contributing was inadequate 
work procedures which allowed 
use of defective equipment. 
Inadequate work control in 
that there was failure to use 
available ~tenna protective 
devices. 
Recommended 
Preventive/Corrective 
Action 
Require periodic(at least 
monthly) maintenance 
inspection of handling gear 
in manufacturing/assembly 
areas. Ensure that manu-
facturing/assembly area 
operating procedures re-
quire "red-tagging" of 
deficient handling gear, 
and removal from service 
\:ntll repair is made. 
Ensure that area work 
procedures require in-
stallation of flight 
hardware protective devices 
during assembly operations, 
when they will not interfere 
with current work. Require 
formal QC inspection and, 
verification of their 
installation. 
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108. 
109. 
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Accident/Incident 
Description 
During first stage engine 
boost test of a space-
craft test article~ the 
vehicle was damaged due 
to failure of a bolt in 
a load adapter. Failure 
occurred at approximately 
139% of a scheduled 
maximum load of l4~. 
During preparations to 
introduce a powdered 
chlorine compound (HTH) 
into drinking fountain 
drains, in an assembly and 
checkout facility, the 
compound ignited, re-
leasing dense clouds of 
chlorine gas.until 
extinguished with 
a C02 fire extinguisher. 
Personnel were evacuated 
with no injuries. 
SECTION III 
FACILITY/aSE SYSTEMS 
Causes 
Inadequate work control in 
assembly of the test set-up 
in that the failed bolt had 
been overstressed in a 
. previous unrelated test and 
was incorrect size for the 
boost test. 
Failure to instruct mainten-
ance crews about the combus-
tion and toxicity hazards of 
HTH. The crew used a plastic 
bottle apparently cont~inated 
with some foreign material 
that ignited on contact with 
the HTH. 
Recommended 
Preventive/Corrective 
Action 
Establish supervisory/QC 
controls to prohibit 
reuse of test set-up 
hardware unacceptably 
damaged or overstressed 
during previous tests. 
Require QC inspection and 
buy-off of test set-up 
assemblies for conformance 
to test set-up drawings 
prior to initiation of 
test on program essential 
equipment. 
Ensure that all maintenance 
personnel are informed of the 
hazards and precautions in 
using HTH. Require hazard 
warnings on HTH containers. 
Require that containers 
used with HTH are washed 
immediately prior to use. 
Accident/Incident 
Description 
110. ~~en the doors on a 
flight vehicle assembly 
building were closed, 
three float 8c~ffolds 
erected earlier were 
caught i!1 the path 
of the clos1ng doors 
and destroyed. 
Ill. During :'llnctional test 
at a space vehicle 
assembly facill ty, a 
helium manifold con-
troller was left 
inside a vacuum dry-
ing oven over the 
weekend a.."1d was badly 
charred, requiring ex-
tensive overhaul. 
~ 
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SECTION III 
FACILITY/GSE SYSTEMS 
Causes 
Personnel error in ~~r.at 
verif1cation of adequate 
door clearances was not 
made before closing. Con-
tr1buting was failure by 
riggers to place requ1red 
flags or signs to warn that 
scaffolds protruded into 
the door's pa~h. 
Malfunction of the over 
power s-..lpply switch relay 
"Tliich kept oven power on 
after the over. pilot switch 
was turned off. Contributing 
were inadequate power shut-
down proced~res in that the 
facility m·ain power supply 
switch was left on, and 
inadequate maintenance pro-
cedures in that the oven 
switch relay had a design 
life of one million cycles 
but was cycled 1.8 million 
times before it failed. 
Recommended 
Preventive/Corrective 
Action 
Eneure that obstructions near 
sliding doors have warning 
flags or eigne when they 
protrude into clearance waye. 
Require +:ha"~ proced~"es 
gove!'Tling ove'1 dry~-nE; 
of program critical ~ard­
ware include shut down o~ 
facili~y main. power ~\:ppl;: 
circuit as well as unit 
pow~r swi~ch at -end of 
daily operations. Ens1'.re 
that maintenance schecr~les 
which specify "[".>r1acernent 
of parts before end of 
design life are prepared 
and followed for all eqt~ipment 
which handles pro~r~~ 
cr.itical hardl'la;1:'"e. 
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Accident/Incident 
Description 
112. During preparation of 
a pneumatic test 
chamber for a high 
pressure impact test 
at 9500 psig the 
sequencing valve was 
being cycled whef\ an 
explosion and GOX 
fire occurred, des-
troying miscellaneous 
chamber equipment. 
There were no personnel 
injuries. 
113. During test of a flight 
experiment package in a 
thermal vacuum chamber, 
the package and associat-
ed equipment we:re severly 
damaged by internal high 
voltage corona discharges 
which occurred when a 
chamber vacuum pump seal 
failed and allowed chamber 
repressurizatlon. 
SECTION III 
FACILITY/aSE SYSTEMS 
Causes 
Material incompatibility 
in that the non-metallic 
material (Vespel 21) used 
for a valve seat reacted 
with the high pressure 
oxygen to cause the explo-
sion. 
Deficient test procedures in 
that the adequacy of the 
test setup was not veriried 
prior to or during the test; 
loss of seal was caused by 
improper positioning of a 
ran used to blow air on a 
LN2 trap-.input solenoid 
valve to preven~ ice build-
up on the valve and sub-
sequ'ent loss or seal to the 
atmosphere. Contributing 
was deficient test setup 
design in that there was 
no provision for automatic 
cutoff of high voltage sources 
in event of pressure rise in 
the chamber. 
Recommended 
Preventive/Corrective 
Action 
Prohibit use of Vespel 21 
mat~rial in applications 
using high pressUI'e oxygen. 
Require safety review/ 
analysis or oxygen system/ 
component designs and 
specifications during their 
development to eliminate 
materials incompatibil1ty. 
Require use of formal pro-
cedures and checklists to 
obtain and veriry proper con-
figuration of test setup in 
test chambers; include 
periodic inspection of test 
system elements for proper 
operation during the test 
run. When conducting vacuum 
tes~s on a specimen having 
a high voltage source that is 
likely to arc in the corona 
pressure range, require in-
stallation of an automatic 
power interrupter ~o shut 
off the high voltage source 
on significant rise in 
chamber pressure. 
114. 
115. 
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Accident/Incident 
Description 
During manufacturing 
assembly of ~ space-
craft module a drain 
bucket used to bleed 
a water glycol trim unit 
was entangled with an 
.intercom extension corj 
.in the module and tlppe.d 
over, spilling water-~lyco I 
solution. There was 
no damage but the incident 
could have caused module 
contamin~tion. 
While cutting a 
structural member on a 
launch support facility, 
molten slag fell on flight 
equipment and lines at 
SECTION III 
FACILITY/GSE SYSTEMS 
Causes 
Inadequate work control ~n 
that the unattended drain 
bucket had not been secured, 
and area ho~sekeeping was 
marginal. 
Inadequate work control in 
that welding operations were 
being performed without pro-
viding protective sh1elds, 
covers, or blankets. 
lower level dam3.ging fluid 
lines and burning electrical 
cabl.es. Subsequent investiga-
tion showed th~t the torch 
was be1ng used only 3 
inches from unprotected 
fuel lines and a 3000 psi 
helium supply line. There 
were no injuries. 
Recommended 
Preventive/Corrective 
Action 
Implement and maIntain 
rigid housekeeping controls 
in flight system assem1::ly 
areas. Require per:1.odlc 
QC inspection during each 
shift.. Prohibit unattended 
liquid containers in work 
areas unless secured from 
inadvertent spill by ~ 
holding fixture. 
DeSignate all welding 
operations around flight 
hardware as safety critical. 
Require inspection and 
safety apPiroval prior to 
welding operations. Require 
protective blankets or 
covers to prevent damage 
from falling welding slag. 
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117. 
Accident/Incident 
Description 
While lowering an 
engine service platform 
lit a launcr. vehicle 
assembly station with 
four hand-operated 
winches, one of the 
winches' failed at the 
cable drum swage con-
nection, allowing one 
side of the platform 
to fall, striking and 
slightly damaging 
one engine. 
While movi~g an engine 
vertical installer from 
the first level of a test-
stand at a test facility, 
the left and right hori-
zontal adjustment hand 
wheel struck. the concrete 
structure of the stand, 
resulting in breaking of 
2 spokes at hub with an 
additional check of one 
. spoke at the outer ring. 
SECTION III 
FACILITY/aSE SYSTEMS 
Causes 
Inadequate work control in 
that the failed winch was 
positioned so that only 3 
cable turns remained on 
';he drum at the time of 
failure; and the lowering 
method used could allow 
uneven distribution of the 
load (overload). CC'ntribu-
tlng was operator error 
in not requiring a halt in 
operations as the cable 
was paid out to the 3 
turn conoitlon. 
Inadequate work procedure 
since there was a lack of 
attention given to the 
clearance needed between the 
installer and the test stand 
as the move was being made. 
Recommended 
Preventive/Corrective 
Action 
Ensure that winches are so 
positioned in work areas 
that at least 3 cable 
turns will remain on the 
winch drum at maximum 
cable extension. Where pos-
e1ble avoid use of inde-
pendently operated winches 
on the same load; use ad-
justable Single point pick-
up tool to livoid uneven 
distribution. Ensure that 
handling personnel are in-
structed and certified for 
safe use of hOisting equip-
ment. 
Require the use of at 
least one observer during 
movement of heavy equipment 
in test areas. Ensure 
that operators are pr~perly 
certified for duties 
being performed. 
118. 
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120. 
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Accident/Incident 
Description 
Du.rir .. g lowering of an 
electrical ~able by a 
me'chanic from an upper 
level of a mobile 
service structure to 
pad level, a cable coil 
lying on the 1eck caught 
his foot, ja~~lng ~i3 
leg against the railing, 
resulting in minor injury. 
During high winds, (tornado 
action) two trailers in a 
launch pad area were over-
turned and destroyed. There 
were no injuries. 
While checking inopera-
tive elevator doors in 
a launch f'3.cill~y Str'.lC-
ture, a workman'S finger 
was. caught between the 
linkage and hangers when 
the elevator was activated. 
The finger was severely 
lacerated. 
.' 
SECTION III 
FACILITY/GSE SYSTEMS 
Causes 
Failure to exercise reaso~l­
able safety precautions in 
that the he,avy cable was not 
properly sec~red to help 
control the lowering opera-
tions. Contributing was 
failure to provide suf~icient 
personnel to safel'l lower 
the cable. 
EnVironmental, trailers were 
torn loose from tie downs by 
tornado action winds. 
Inadequate work cO:1trol in 
that the doors were being 
checked with the elevator 
power on. 
Recommended 
Preventive/Corrective 
Action 
Require s;:).fety secur1ng of 
all portable equipme:it when 
it is being raised or 
lowered. Ensure tr.a,; 
suffiCient ?arsonnel are 
assigned to safely handle 
raising and lowerIng of 
portable apparatus. 
Req~ire that ~afety standards 
and pr~c!lut.ionar~r neasures be 
established for protection of 
tigh value trailers in areas 
subject to high winds. 
When working on e le'Tator 
systems ensure that the 
elevator power source is 
turned orf and ei '.;her 
locked out or guarded by a 
co-worker. 
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Accident/Incident 
Description 
121. D~ring inspection of 
a stage pressure regula-
tor the :nspector 
dropped it and it fell 
4 feet to the floor, 
requiring component 
return to the vendor 
for reinspection and 
retest. 
122. During installation of 
~ servoactuator on a 
spacecraft engine, a 
certified position and 
holding fixture (P&HF) 
failed, permitting the 
free end of the servo-
actuator to rotate and 
fall 3 feet, striking 
two technicians and 
a steel work bench, 
resulting in minor in-
juries to the technicians 
and minor damage to the 
servoactuator. 
SECTION III 
FACILITY/GSE SYSTEMS 
Causes 
Inadequate inspection pro-
cedures in that positive 
component protec~ion was 
not provided during inspec-
tion. A contributing cause 
was failure to exercise 
reasonable safety precau-
tions during component 
handling. 
Design deficiency in that 
the P&HF wae in a failed con-
dition prior to use but the 
design configuration did 
not permit ready inspection 
of the failed item (a shoulder 
screw); and the failed con-
dition may have been induced 
by a standard proof load test 
(150% of safe working load). 
Contributing was poor workman-
ship ~uring P&HF fahrication. 
Recommended 
Preventive/Corrective 
Action 
Ensure that inspec~ion 
procedures Y"~quire po~itive 
positioning and protection 
of critical eqUipment during 
inspection activities. 
Ensure that GSE fixtures 
which handle end-item 
hardware are designed 80 that 
c.ri tical wear point 8 can 
be readily inspected prior 
to use, and can be subjected 
to rigid QC inspection 
during fabrication. Require 
handl1ng/l1""ting equipment 
to be designed with a mini-
mum safety factor of 5, 
and ensure that any components 
subject to repeated load 
stresses can be easily 
inspected for fatigue. 
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A.cc1dent/Inc1dent 
Description 
123. A laboratory technician 
in a materials test 
facility was exposed 
to x-ray radiation due 
to failure of a safety 
device (lead shield) 
on a diffraction unit 
which became jammed in 
the open position. 
124. During material curing 
operations at a test 
facility, a technician 
reached in the oven and 
received second degree 
burns. I 
.: " 
SECTION III 
FA.CILITY/GSE SYSTEMS 
Causes 
Inadequate x-ray diffrac-
tion unit design in that the 
lead shieldwas internal to 
the unit ~nd its open/close 
status WaS not sufficiently 
visible external to the unit. 
Contributing was inadequate 
procurement/receiving in-
spection and checko~t in that 
the design deficiency was not 
detected prior to or at 
the time of installation. 
Personnel error in reaching 
into hot oven. Contribu't;·ing 
Was failure to provide proper 
tools for reaching in the 
oven. 
Recommended 
Preventive/Corrective 
Action 
Require positive indication/ 
warning of position status 
of shields used in x-ray 
units or systems. Require 
pre-procureme,nt radiation 
safety review of units deSign 
to verify adequacy of 
controls. Require radiation 
safety inspection/checkout 
of safety controls operability 
prior to~erational activa-
tion. 
Ensure that all personnel 
working with curing chambers 
are properly trained and 
certif1ed. Ensure that 
specific instructions are 
issued specifying tools to 
be used and procedures to 
be followed in curing 
operations. 
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125. 
126. 
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Aocident/lncident 
Description 
During test build-up 
in a thermochemical 
test facility, insula-
tion on an electrical 
immersion type heater 
caught fire due to 
failure of gaseous 
nitrogen flow over the 
heaters, and subsequent 
erroneous positioning 
of the heater control 
SWitch. 
During maintenance 
operations requiring 
exchange of two opera-
tional mass spectrometers 
for'malfunctioning ones 
Situated on upper levels 
of ~ checkout facility, 
three units were placed 
into the hOisting basket 
at one time and, as one 
of the units was being 
off1oaded, it swung over 
and collided with 
another, damaging two 
gages. 
SECTION III 
FACILITY/aSE SYSTEMS 
Causes 
Inadequate heating system 
design in that the heaters 
were dependent on nitrogen 
gas flow to keep them from 
overheating and there were 
no interlocks to automatical-
ly shut down the heaters in 
case of gas flow failure. 
Also, no heater case tempera-
ture gages to indicate over-
temperature conditions; group-
ing and labeling of heaters' 
control switches in such a 
manner that erroneous identi-
fication of their positions 
could be, and was, made. 
Inadequate work control 
procedures in placing more than 
one instrument at a time in a 
Sling and failure to properly 
proteot instruments prior to 
movement. 
Recommended 
Preventive/Corrective 
Aotion 
Require positive switch 
cutouts for control of 
gas flow dependent heaters, 
to aotivate in ev.ent of 
low gas flow. Require 
temperature readouts for 
each heater case used in 
test systems. Require 
separate positive indicating 
off-on switches for eaoh 
heater ul!ed in test systems. 
Require that only one 
high value/fragile test 
instrument or similar 
hardware item be hoisted 
at a time. Requir~ QC 
verifioation of proper . 
hardware protection and 
padding prior to hoisting 
high value/critical program 
hardware. 
\J1 
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Accident/Incident 
Description 
127. During spacecraft 
assembl~r testing, a 
ground-support module 
cooling unit lost its 
capability to supply 
water-glycol cooling, 
necessitating test 
shut down and a four 
hour delay in opera-
tions. There was no 
damage to spacecraft 
component s • 
129. During clean room 
operatIons three 
technicians became 
ill from inhalation of 
freon fumes shortly 
after turning on the 
freon cleaning unit 
master switch at the 
start of the second 
shift. They were un-
aware that the freon 
pump switch had been 
left on by first shift 
personnel. 
SECTION III 
FACILITY/aSE SYSTEMS 
Causes 
Personnel error. Failure to 
follow proper mainten~nce 
procedures in that the cooling 
unit had been only partially 
refilled with freon during 
ser"Jicing. 
Inadequate work control 
procedures for coordinating 
information between shift 
changes beco:tuse the freon 
cleaning unit was shut down 
at the end of the first 
shift by switching the master 
switch off and leaving the 
discharge hose on the floor 
with the pump switch on; 
thi.a condition was not 
transmitted to second shift 
personnel. Contributing was 
that the clean room had 
laminar down. flow into sub-
flooring so that discharge 
of freo~ from the hose was 
not readily detectable. 
Recommended 
Preventive/Corrective 
Action 
Require thorough post-
servicing/main~enance test 
and functional checl{out of 
all GSE environmental 
control equipment used in 
essential operations prior 
to peturning to operations. 
Require use of shift-
change checklists in clean 
room operations to transmit 
essential information on 
status and conditio~ of test 
and operating equipJlent. 
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Accident/Incident 
Description 
" 
129. While the system was 
operating, the water 
separator bowl on an 
industrial air system 
facility exploded. 
There were no injuries. 
130. During flight readiness 
test of a manned s;)Tstem 
the launch structure was 
struck by lightning, 
causing minor damage to 
automatic checkout 
equipment. 
131. During manufacturing 
operations a non-stain-
less steel reducer in 
a cleaning tank air line 
failed resulting in a 
30-40 gallon nitric 
acid spill. There was 
minor damage to tank 
plumbing and the . 
cleaning room. floor. 
. SECTION III 
FACILITY/aSE SYSTEMS 
Causes 
Material failure in that 
a crack in the bowl was 
undetected and constant 
press~re caused it to 
enlarge until failure 
occurred. 
Environmental in that 
apparently the lightning 
strike ~raveled through 
the ground to the checkout 
eqUipment. There was no 
evidence of inadequate 
grounding or safety pro-
cedures. 
Unqualified workmen erro-
neously installed the air 
line directly into the side 
instead of over the top of 
the tank,allowing acid to 
corrode the st·~el reducer. 
Contributing was fa.ilure to 
inspect work for conformance 
with approved work drawings 
prior to use. 
Recommended 
Preventive/Corrective 
Action 
Ensure that inspection 
prccedures provide for 
periodic checks of water 
separator bowls in industrial 
air systems. 
Require post-strike/electrical 
storm checks for damage to 
essential equipment. Ensure 
periodic inspection and 
continuity checks of the 
grounc.ing of lightning pro-
tection systems. 
Ensure that personnel involved 
with insta.llatio~maintenance 
of hazardous assemblies are 
specifically certified for 
their job. Require QC verifi-
cation or all installation 
work involving hazardous 
materials and critical hardware. 
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Accident/Incident 
Description 
132. D~ring pull test o~ ~n 
item of ground test 
support equip~ent use1 
in de~elopment testing, 
~ component of the ~est 
article was broken due 
to excess pull force 
applied by use of a 
facility overhead cr~~e. 
There were ~0 personnel 
injuries. 
133. During facility modifica-
tions, a contractor per-
formed inspection usi~g 
a gamma raY source without 
first securing approval 
of the radiological 
safety officer, and wi~h­
out instituting adequate 
area control and warning 
procedures. There were 
no accidents or incidents. 
SECTION III 
FACILITY/GSE SYSTEMS 
C~uses 
Inadequate/deficient test 
oroccdures in ';hat th~ use 
of the overhead crane waS 
suostituted for a malfunc-
tioning hydro set tool 
aEsigned for pull test use, 
to expedite test operations. 
Management failure to 
establish and implement 
policy to include radiological 
health procedure requirements 
in facility contracts goverR-
ing radiographic inspection. 
Recommended 
Preventive/Corrective 
Action 
Prohibi'c ~lse of substitute 
test tools and fixtures 
for test of essential 
equipment unless certainty 
is established that 
safe test parameters will 
not be exceeded by use 
of such substitutes. 
Require the inclusion of 
radiologic.al safety and 
health requirements in 
safety and .health clauses, 
and other pertinent 
clauses, of facility con-
tacts where radiographic 
equipment is used. 
\..11 
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134. 
135. 
Accident/Incident 
Description 
During post-assembly 
test of a spacecraft 
oxygen system, while 
a cap was being 
torqued on an oxygen 
simulator panel, the 
back-up wrench elipp~d 
off an elbow fitting 
resulting in da:m3.ge 
to and repl3.cement of 
an adjacent line. 
During manufacturing , 
checkcut a "tift-A-
Loft" being oper3.ted ::td-
jacent to a vehicle 
stage made contact with 
the stage causing two 
gouges, one 1" xlI" 
and the other approxi-
mately 1" square 91ld 
3/4" deep. 
SECTION III 
FACILITY/GSE SYSTEMS 
Causes 
Deficient Simulator panel 
design in that insufficent 
clear space was provided 
around t:le eluow to allow 
a secure grip with assigned 
tools. Contributi~g was 
personnel error in not taking 
'adequate precautions to pro-
tect -adjacent hardware during 
torquing operations. 
Inadequate work control in 
that verification of clear-
ances W3:8 not made prior to 
vehicle movement. 
Recommended 
Preventive/Corrective 
Action 
Require maintainability 
review/analysis during 
design of test equipment, 
to verify design compatibility 
witb standard cools or to 
identify special tool re-
qUirement.s. Ensure that 
maintenance/test personnel 
are adequately trained and 
instructed in the pre-
caution3 necessa~J to protect 
essential equipmp.nt juring 
maintenance/adjust~e~t 
operations. 
Requir·~ an observer to 
assist in verifying clear-
ances to operator when 
using handling/lifting 
equipment around flight 
hardware. 
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ACCident/Incident 
De sc~ipt ion 
136. While on portable 
scaffolding in an 
137. 
assembly and checkout 
facility, a technician 
using a safety belt 
tethered to a trolley 
installed in an over-
head channel inadvertent-
ly· dislodged the trolle:>, 
stop, allowing the trolley 
to fallon him, causing 
minor head injury. 
During use of a preposi-
tioned TV set-up, a 
remotely controlled flood 
light was activated whilp. 
lying face down and 
ignited a tar paper roof 
near the LOX pad. The 
light was disconnected and 
the fire was extinguished 
with minor damage to the 
roof. 
SECTION III 
FACILITY/GSE SYSTEMS 
Causes 
Personnel error. The work-
man, by repeated yanking on 
the harness, forced the 
trolley beyond the stop. 
Contributing was ,1esign de-
ficiency since the stop 
should have been immovable 
when struck by the trolley. 
Inadequate work control since 
the light was left connected 
to the remotely controlled 
power source after its pedestal 
had been removed for mainten-
ance. 
Recommended 
Preventive/Corrective 
Action 
Ensure that the design of ~ll 
trolley etops will prevent 
inadvert'ent trolley dislodge-
ment. Ensure that worlonen 
are inetructed on any limit-
ations on equipment being 
used. 
Prohibit the use of electrical 
lamps near flammable materials 
unless equipped with adequl1te 
safety devices. Require safety 
inspection and cert1fication 
of all high intensity and heat 
lamps installed nel1r LOX, fuel, 
or ordnance areas. Ensure that 
maintenance procedures require 
positive disconnecting of all 
electrical equipment prior to 
beginning maintenance work. 
Accident/Incident 
Description 
138. During painting of a 
static test tower at 
the 150 ft. level, 
a contractor painter was 
using a boatswain's 
chair and associated 
rigging for support. 
While the painter was 
being hoisted in the 
boatswain's chair, 
a manila rope in the 
block-and-tackle broke 
causing the painter to 
fallout of the chair 
and sustain fatal 
injuries. 
139. During operational test 
of a spacecraft, a 
water glycol cooling 
circulation unit lost 
electrical power, re-
sulting in test s~ut 
down for 29 minute •• 
There was no damage to 
spacecraft components. 
\Jl 
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SECTION III 
FACILITY/GSE SYSTEMS 
Causes 
Material failure In that 
the rigging rope failed. 
Contributing causes were 
inadequate work control 
over contr~ctor activities 
and failure to require 
inspection, and certification 
of the contractor'e rigging 
prior to use, and failure 
of the contractor to use 
required safety restraints. 
Inadequate design in that a 
28 VDC cable plug dropped out 
of the facil~ty receptacle 
causing the shut down. 
Recommended 
Preventive/Corrective 
Action 
Require safety inspection 
and tagging of all rope 
rigging lines to be used 
for personnel prior to 
each use, whether contractor 
or government owned. 
Require that power and 
control circuitry on 
critical test support equip-
ment connectors be equipped 
with positive retentionl 
restraining devices. 
'l 
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Accident/Incident 
Description 
140. While a block-and-
tackle rigging in ~n 
assembly and checkout 
facility was being used 
to lift a bundle of 
test cables, the snap 
hook sliding bar failed, 
allowing the block and 
tackle to fall, striking 
a hard-hat-wearing work-
man on the head, causing 
minor injury. 
141. During flush line servic-
ing, trichlorethylene 
(TRIC) vented into a 
mobile launcher work com-
partment, necessitating 
personnel evacuation. No 
damage or injury. 
SECTION III 
FACILITY/GSE SYSTEMS 
Causes 
Inadequate work control pro-
cedures in that lifting 
operations commenced without 
a QC or safety validation of 
rigging proof loading! 
capacity. 
Material failure in that a 
valve failed in the mobile 
flush and purge servicer, 
allowing TRIC to leak. 
Recommended 
Preventive/Corrective 
Action 
Require inspection and vali-
dation of special rigging set-
ups prior to use. Ensure that 
all workmen using or rigging 
lifting gear are qualified and 
certified for their job. 
DeSignate all TRIC flushing 
operations as hazardous. 
Perform hazard analysis of all 
flush line servicing opera-
tions to identify potential 
personnel hazards and 
emergency actions in ca~~ of 
TPIC vapor release. 
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Accident/Incident 
Description 
142. During checkout work on 
143. 
a spacecraft, a cast 
aluminum support 
fi~ting on a scaffold 
failed while a technician 
was climbing up. There 
Wel'e no injuries. 
DurIng furnace brazing 
an R&D engine injector 
was destroyed when the 
furnace temperature 
increased from the normal 
19000 F. to 2400° F. 
and melted copper parts 
of the injector. There 
was also moderate structu~­
al damage to the furnace. 
SECTION III 
FACILITY/aSE SYSTEMS 
Causes 
Material failure in that 
the support fitting broke 
under normal service con-
ditions as a result of fatigue. 
Recommended 
Preventive/Corrective 
Action 
Require periodic safety 
inspection by supervision 
of scaffold fittings and 
supports to detect signs 
of inCipient failure, such 
as thread cracks. 
~lfunction of the temperature Ensure QC inspection of 
control thermocouple circuit all electrical circuit 
which gave an erroneously low installation and maintenance 
temperature reading due to an in electrical furnaces to 
electrical short circuit be used with critical Re:D 
between the temperature re- and end item 11ardware prior 
cording instrument inner ~oor to use. Eneure furnace 
and wire of the thermocouple brazing and heating specifi-
filter circuit. Contributing cations and procedures 
were faulty installation pro- require monitoring of 
cedures and poor QC inspection fUrnace temperature as well 
which led to the short circ:.tit- as item temperature on all 
ing, and inadequate design furnaces used with program 
which did not allow for monitoring essential hardware. 
furnace temperature along with 
the temperature of the item 
being heated. 
i 
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Accident/Incident 
Description 
144. During torch cutting 
operations in a launch 
facility, molten slag 
fell to a lower le-J'el, 
igniting plastic film 
being used in conj~n~­
tionwith a drain set-
un. The fire caused 
only mir.or damage and 
no injuries. 
145. During work on an 
upper level of a mobile 
launcher, a hold down 
arm hood pivot bolt, 
which was being removed, 
was forced out and fell 
to ground level. No 
injury or damage re-
sulted, ~ut a similar 
mishap could cause 
severe injury or damage 
to flight hard~are. 
SECTION III 
FACILITY/GSE SYSTEMS 
Causes 
Failure tc follow required 
procedures in that blanketing 
of the area around the cutting 
operation was inadequate and 
permitted hot slag to fallon 
the plastic film; and the 
cutting operation was under-
taken without prior safety 
~learance. 
Failure to follow required 
procedures in that ~he pivot 
bolts were removed without a 
sling and crane being attached 
to the hood to relieve pressure. 
Recommended 
Preventive/Corrective 
Action 
Ensure that all welding 
operations in a launch 
facility are s~fety in-
spected prior to beginning 
work. Require safety 
training and certification 
of welders for work in 
haz$lrdous areas. 
Ensure that procedures ~d/or 
checklists are followed during 
all work on flight systems and 
support structures. Where-
ever pOSSible, provide 
safety netting around upper 
level operations. 
\Jl 
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Acc1dent/Inc1dent 
Description 
146. Several ordnance-activat-
ed vent valves received 
minor d~age when loose 
packing material in the 
store room caught rire 
from sparks of welding 
operations in an adjacent 
room. There was severe 
damage to storage area. 
No injuries. 
147. During assembly of a 
multiple adapter unit, 
a rivet bucking bar 
was dropped and 
impacted a coaxial 
cable connected to a 
switch box, pulling 
the catle out of its 
connector on the switch. 
There was minor damage 
to the connector. 
SECTION III 
FACILITY/GSE SYSTEMS 
Causes 
Inadequate work control of 
welding operations in 
failing to inspect for near-
by combustibles. COintribut-
ing cause was housekeeping 
policy which permitted storing 
flammables near ordnance 
items. 
Inadequate work control in 
that program essential equip-
ment wa~ not protected . 
from inadvertent damage 
during assembly operations. 
Recommended 
Preventive/Corrective 
Action 
Designate all welding 
operations as hazardous. 
Require pre-operational 
area inspection and safety 
clearance, and the use of 
a spark barricadejblanket 
for all welding operations. 
Enforce housekeeping 
policies which prohibit 
storing combustibles with 
ordnance items. 
Require protect i..,re covers 
over prograrr. eqUipment 
when work is .being perform-
ed adjacent to or above the 
items. Require that all 
hand tools be restrained 
when being used above 
eSSential equipment. Require 
screens or netting around 
work platform areas located 
above essential equipment. 
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148. 
149. 
Accident/Incident 
Description 
During hgndli~g o~~r~tlons. 
a &llde wire cabl~ d~~ wa~ 
~carred and bent when ~ 
locking pin lodged in the 
locking frame. 
While the high rise 
elevator at a launch 
and checkout facil1ty 
was in operation, bolts 
on the stabilizer car 
failed, allowing pieces 
to fall to lower levels. 
150. During assembly opera-
tions in a clean room, 
a fan being used to 
circulate air into a 
unit of flight 113rciware 
caught fire, due to an 
electrical short resul~­
ing from previous impact 
damage to the motor 
hous1ng. 
SECTION III 
FACILITY/GSE SYSTEMS 
Causes 
Failure to follow required 
procedures in that the drum 
was put into motion while 
the locking pin was being 
removed. Failure to coordi-
nate simultaneous operations. 
Material failure in that two 
of four bolts fa1led, probal:l-
ly due to metal fatigue. Con-
tributing was failure to 
perform daily inspection of 
bo'lts when normal 5 day 
work week was extended to 
7 days. 
Procedural in that existing 
mishap reporting procedures 
did not require reporting 
of the mishap which damaged 
the motor housing. Contribu-
ting was a design deficiency 
in that the fan did not have 
an .overheat protection de'rice. 
Recommended 
Preventive/Corrective 
Action 
Where possible require all 
cable drums with safety lock 
mechaniems to be plac3rded 
with warning notices to pre-
vent operation prior to re-
leaSing the l~ck. 
Eneure that faci11ty "d~ily" 
inspection orocedur~s are 
carried out when normal work 
week is extenden. 
R.equire that all electrical 
aSE/facility motors used 
during assembly of fligr.~ hard-
ware be equipped wit:, overheat 
protection devices. :Sstablish 
procedures for i~~edlately 
reporting and documei1+-,ing all 
nishaps and corrective actio~s 
which imrolve any damage to 
aSE/facility equipm,,!:-,t used 
during assembly of flight 
hardware. 
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Accident/Incident 
Description 
151. A technIcian was 
opening a one pound 
can of finishing 
compound at a test 
facility when the lid 
blew off and the 
compound blew out 
into the air. 
152. D'..tring assembly of a 
flight system module 
a wo~knan fell from ~ 
pl~tform.receiving 
minor inj'J.ries. 
SECTION III 
FACILITY/aSE SYSTEMS 
Causes 
Material failure in that 
the compound had chemically 
decomposed from old age 
and formed a 33.S whIc~ 
created sufficient pressur~ 
to blow orf the lid of 
the can when it was partially 
loosened. 
l'he priml.ry cause was th~t 
super"Jisory personnel allowed 
workmen ~o use an unst~=le 
pll.tform. Contributing were 
failure to make a temporary 
fix with rope, ~ two-month 
delay in fulfilling a repair 
work order. and a nor.-approved 
structural change in the 
platform. 
Recommended 
Preventive/Corrective 
Action 
Develop a program '~:l ::'c1entify 
all materials subject to 
hazardous decomposition 
and est~blish procernlres for 
their routine removal ~rom 
stock ~~rore critical 
age is reache1. 
DeSignate work on overhead 
platforms as hazardous. 
Ensure that supervisors 
prevent use of unsafe work 
platforms. Require prior 
approval and post-change 
safety inspection of all 
st~J.ctural modifications. 
Establish procedures to 
expedite repair of 
hazardous personnel support 
structures • 
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Accident/Incident 
__ De_s?.2:1 pt iC!~ 
153. While performing c:!.rc-_d~ 
etching operations j'.:.!"~ng 
m3.nufacturing, Ci. 
technician Vi3.S exposed 
to toxic fumes. 
SECTION III 
FACILITY/GSE SYSTEMS 
Causes 
InadP.quate capacity of tr.e 
exh~ust system which did 
not 3.dequately carry aw3.y 
fumes. Contributing W3.S 
failure to check and 
monitor system for toxic 
fumes. 
154. During modification wo'!"'k on Personnel error due to poor 
an elevator in a launch stru~work area practices ~d pro-
ture, a mechanic apnarently 
inadvertently activat~d 3. 
~ortable elevator contr~l 
switch, moving the ele'''3.~or 
downward and trapning hi~ 
arm between elevato!' 3.!:.d 
shaft 8tI'1.lctur~, resul+:in-; 
in serious injury a~d ~u~se­
quent amputation of the 3.rm. 
cedures by placing ewitch 
where it could be inadvertently 
activated. Contributing was 
design deficiency in that the 
portable switch could be in-
advertently struck by some 
object or stepped on thereby 
activating the elevator move-
ment. 
Recommended 
Preventive/Corrective 
Action 
-----
Ensure t:hat all op-=ratlonl:' 
in-ITolving +;oxic fumes have 
teen checked and certified 
for sarety. Require all 
exhaust systems to be 
safety verified for adequ3.cy. 
Require that elevator portable 
control switches be deSigned 
to preclude inadvertent 
switching. Ensure that ele-
vator mech~~ics are properly 
trained on methods and pro-
cedures required to maintain 
a safe work area. 
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Accident/Incident 
Description 
155. During routine test 
work at a laboratory 
work table configured 
with an RF induction 
heater, a rese"3.rch 
~ssistant received 
electrical shock re-
sulting in arm burn~, 
due to contact with 
an exposed RF outlet. 
156. Following operational 
checkout of an electro-
magnetic interference 
(EMI) test set-up in 
an RF anechoic chamber, 
a fire occurred in the 
RF absorber, resulting 
in minor damage to the 
absorber. 
SECTION III 
FACILITY/GSE SYSTEMS 
Causes 
Inadequate design of warning 
devices in that although ~ 
blinking red light was 
activated when the RF power 
was on, it was so located 
that the ~echnician could, and 
did, fail to notice it. Con-
tributing was ~nadequate 
shielding on the RF outlet. 
Design deficiency in that 
the RF absorber was not 
grounded, permitting arCing 
between the RF coax cable 
and the absorber when the 
cable was in cloeeproximity 
to the absorber. 
Recommended 
Preventive/Corrective 
Action 
Require safety review/ 
verification of laboratory 
warning systems and RF 
power outlet,S for adequacy 
and compatibility 
with laborator"J operations." 
Establish a standard for 
EMI test set-up in an RF 
anechoic chamber, including 
a requirement for minimum 
one foot separation between 
absorber and cable. When 
RF cables carry more than 
10 volts, additional ground-
ing, adequate to prevent 
cable jacket RF voltage 
build-up must be provided. 
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Accident/Incident 
Description 
157. During development test-
ing, the sight gage 
of a steam generator 
on a laborato~J auto-
clave sterilization unit 
, fa.iled, re leasing 
steam and water. ~n 
e'nployee attempting to 
clear the area, received 
minor injury when r.e 
slipped and fell. Only 
the gage was damaged. 
158. During post operational 
testing, personnel i~ a 
facility laborato~J were 
exposed to toxic Eeta-
propiolactone (B-P) 
vapors emanating from a 
broken 1 Kg. tottle of 
crystallized E-P stored 
in a cabinet. B-? waS 
not used in the lab ~1 
lab tec.hnicians had !"'.o 
knowledge that it was 
present or how it had 
gotten there. No seri-
ous injury resulted. 
SECTION III 
FACILITY/GSE SYSTEMS 
Causes 
Inadequate inspection/ 
checkout procedures in 
that the unit had been 
damaged during shipmen~ 
and there was no record 
that the unit had been 
inspected and checked 
out at the time of 
activation (:;.pproximately 
1 month prior to the mis-
hap. ) 
Inadequate work control 
in that the B-P appare~tly 
had been stored in the 
cabinet ~ long time without 
having been disco-Jered or 
inventoried. Contributing 
was inadequate storage 
procedures in that B-P should 
be stored at+ 5" to+ 10· C. 
Recommended 
Preventive/Corrective 
Action 
Require formal inspection 
and verifica.tion of press.ure 
uni t,s damaged in shipment 
prior to operational 
activation. 
Require, as a minimum, 
quarterly safety inspections 
of laboratories to ensure 
that any hazardous chemicals 
or conditions are identified. 
Irnpl~ment formal proced~res 
for requisitioning and 
control of hazardous 
chemicals in laboratories. 
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Accident/Incident 
_DescrJ~tion 
159. Dur~ng manufacturing 
operations, a worker 
who was standing on the 
catwalk of a space 
vehicle support fixture, 
fell through a 12 11.-14" 
access opening between 
the end of the h~ndraii 
and end of the catwalk 
and landed on the vehicle. 
The worker sust:l.ineda 
concussion :l.nd other 
injuries. There was no 
damage to the vehicle. 
160. After working hours, :l. 
f1re occurred 1n :l. ware-
house due to ignition of 
oil-saturated cardboard 
boxes by radiated heat 
from a heat sealer. 
destroying 20 pieces 
of electronic eq~1pment 
and causing first and 
second degree burns to a 
night watchman who 
attempted to extingu1sh 
the fire. 
SECTION III 
FACILITY/aSE SYSTEMS 
Causes 
Inadequ~te work area 
procedures in that there 
was no protective barrier 
or warning placard at the 
open1ng to prevent personnel 
from In:l.dvertently falling 
through. 
Inadequate work control in 
that an electrical heat 
sealing device located :l.mong 
the cardboard boxes was 
left on at the end of the 
working day. Contributing 
was inadequate housekeeping 
of the packing area in th:l.t 
flammable material was 
stored in the packing area. 
Recommended 
Preventiv~Corrective 
Action 
Ensure that work pro-
cedures require safetl in-
spection of catw~lksl 
workstands at cumpletion of 
initial assembly and when 
changing their configuration 
to verify the adequacy of 
barriers and warning placards. 
Require procedures/checklists 
for supervisory inspection 
of packaging areas fo~ hazards 
at end of work sM ft. 
Develop procedures and check-
lists for identification of 
flammable materials and store 
them in areas sep~:l.te 
from packing oper~tlons. 
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Accident/Incident 
De script ion 
161. During maintenance 
operations a technician 
was disconnecting a 
mercury-filled vacuum 
gage from a hypobaric 
test chamber when the 
gage broke, causing 
mercury to splash on 
his face and into his 
eyes. 
162. ~ring equipment main-
tenance in a thermo-
chemical test laboratory. 
chilled Freon 22 splash-
ed on a technician from 
an uncapped line he had 
previously disconnected, 
causing extensive first 
degree burns. 
l~3. During install~tion of 
a large vacuum testing 
chamber, workmen using 
a cutting torch dropped 
slag onto freon line 
insulation, starting a 
fire. 
SECTION III 
FACILITY/GSE SYSTEMS 
Causes 
Personnel erro~. The 
technician bumped the gage 
with sufficient force to 
break it while attempting 
to remove a flexible 
CO'!1nection which attached the 
gage to the chamber. 
Inadequate procedures in 
that the technician did not 
install a cap on the open 
tube to prevent the liquid 
Freon 22 from escaping when 
the pressure built up due to 
gas P3.porization. 
Procedural in ~hat no 
asbesto e fire blanket was 
used and no fire watch 
set~ Also, the required 
"Hazardous Operation Work 
Permit" had not been 
obtained. 
Recommended 
Preventive/Corrective 
Action 
Instruct and certify 
technicians in proper pro-
cedures for protecting 
delicate/hazardous instruments 
:'luring maintenance operations. 
Whenever possible, replace 
mercury-filled gages with 
a satisf~ctory mercury-
free suhsti t,.te, such as 
a capacitance manometer. 
E~sure work procedures 
require that the open ends 
of all fluid/gas lines be 
capped during maintenance/ 
modification operations. 
DeSignate all welding 
and cutting torch operations 
as hazardous. Require 
safety inspection and 
verification prior to be-
ginning all such operations. 
Stress the necessity for 
supervisory personnel to 
closely monitor welding 
and cutting operations. 
0"1 
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Accident/Incident 
Description 
164. Following testing 
operations in a labora-
tory, a nitrogen valve 
in a mass spectrometer 
was left on resulting 
in split water lines and 
damage to the facility 
floor. 
165. During m~intenance 
welding and cutting 
operations in a flight 
simulation laboratory 
hot sl'iLg fell on an air 
duct and ignited the 
insulation,resultlng in 
minor darnage~ 
SECTION III 
FACILITY/aSE SYSTEMS 
Causes 
Inadequate work control 
in that the nitrogen valve 
was not shut off at the 
end of the day. 
Procedural in that no 
asbestos fire blanket was 
us~d. Also, the required 
"Hazardous Operation Work 
Permit" had not been 
obtained. 
Recommended 
Preventive/Corrective 
Action 
Develop checklists for 
daily activation and shutdown 
of labor'iLtories and ensure 
their use by all laboratory 
personnel. 
DeSignate all welding 
and cutting torch operations 
as hazardous. Req~ire 
safety inspection and 
verification prior to 
beginning all such opera-
tions~ Stress the necessity 
for supervisory personnel 
to monitor welding/cutting 
operations. 
Accident/Incident 
Description 
166. During crew training 
in ast~onaut rescue 
procedures, the test 
subject suffered a 
back injury while 
b8ing removed from 
the test ctamber. 
167. While performing 
routine mai::1t;enar.ce 
. "t'"r 
on the rail of a 'non-
rail hoist near the 
ceiling of a hypobaric 
ch~ber, a workM~n 
received a severe 
elec~rical shock when 
his hand came in contact 
·""'4' 
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. with the 480 VAC bus 
bar channel in the 
rail. He fell off the 
hoist but Was caught 
by other workers. 
.. 
SECTION III 
FACILITY/GSE SYSTEMS 
Causes 
:!:::1adeauate work control. 
The trainees were allowed 
to p~ll the test ~lbject 
from the chamber While 
the bulk. of h~.s weight 
was still suspended from 
an o'!erhead rail. Possibly 
conl~r::'buting was failure 
to repor~ a previous 
similar injury which may 
~ave left test subject's 
ba~kin a weakE"ned condi-
::ion. 
Ir.adequate work control. 
The workman used the 
hoist as a work platform 
instead of using a ladder 
or portable scaffolding, 
and also was not using 
a safety harness. 
Recommended 
Preventive/Corrective 
Action 
Ens'l;.re close supervisio:: 
of "escue training pro-
cedure~ by qualified 
p~rsc:1r.el. Require 
periodic meji~c.l ex~.!ninl'l.­
tion and qu~lification 
of 3.'.1 research and 
traini::1g test subjects. 
Establish positive work 
control procedures to 
ensure the briefing of 
viorkers on job requirements, 
restrictions and potential 
tazards. Require the use 
of safety oelts for all 
overhead werk where there 
are no railings or other 
positive safety restraints. 
Require electrical power to 
be shut off and locked o~t 
on hoisting eqUipment when 
not in use. 
0'1 
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Accident/Incident 
Descriptien 
168. While relocating a 
werk platferm during 
spacecraft manufacturing 
eperations, a welding 
machine on tep ef the 
platform fell to the 
fleor resulting in 
extensive d~~ge to 
the m~chine. There 
was no personnel injury 
or damage to flight 
hardware. 
169. During post assembly 
flushing and drying 
ef spacecraft plumbing, 
the flushing cart pump 
motor overheated and 
caught fire, resulting 
in ,damage to, the moter. 
170. During assembly inspec-
tion,of a stage from an 
upper level work pl~tform, 
a werkman drepped a 110 
VAC portable work l~ght 
onto, the stage forward 
bulkhead pretective 
cover. The cover pre-
vented any 'flight hard-
ware damage. 
SECTION III 
FACILITY/GSE SYSTEMS 
Causes 
Personnel errer in that 
there was failure to secure 
the welding machine in 
accordance with established 
procedures. Contributing 
was in~dequate werk centrel 
precedures in that there was 
no requirement to verify the 
safe configuration of the 
platform ~ea prior to move-
ment. 
Inadequate design since the 
moter was not equipp~d with 
a thermal overload pretection 
device. 
Inadequat~ werk control 
in that the work light was 
not ,tethered. Contributing 
was personnel error in that 
the employee failed to 
exercise adequate precautiens 
when working on flight hard-
ware. 
Recommended 
Preventive/Corrective 
Action 
Require safety inspection 
and verification that 
teols and eqUipment en 
werk platforms are remeved 
er secure prior to, platform 
movement. 
Require that all GSE/facility 
equipment metors used 
during assembly/test of 
flight hardware have therm~l 
overload protectien devices 
installed. 
Require tethering of 
equipment/teols used en werk 
platferms above flight hard-
ware. Require that personnel 
werking above and areund 
flight hardware be certified 
and instructed in werk pro-
cedures to prevent toel/ 
hardware droppage. 
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Accident/Incident 
Description 
171. During manufacturing 
assembly of a flight 
module, a cle'lis pin 
fell from an upper 
work level into an 
uncovered section of 
the module and did 
minor damage to 
installed equipment. 
172. During the installation 
of a kick plate on a 
work platform in a 
stage manufacturing 
area, the stage side-
wall insulation was 
struck by the kick 
plate resulting in inden-
tation in the spray 
foam apprOXimately 411 
long by!" wide. Stage 
move was delayed I! 
hours • 
SECTION III 
FACILITY/aSE SYSTEMS 
Causes 
Inadequate work control in 
that there was no protective 
barrier in place to catch 
the falling clevis pin. 
Contributing was personnel 
. error in that an employee 
at the upper level failed to 
exereise adequate precaution 
when working on flight hard-
ware. 
Failure to exercise adequate 
supervision and maintain 
proper work control. 
Reconunended 
Preventive/Correct1ve 
Action 
Require installation of 
barriers and/or cat.ch nets 
when work is being performed 
above flight hardware. 
Require that personnel l'lork-
ing above and around flight 
hardWare be instructed and 
certified in work procedures 
to prevent tool/hardware 
droppage. 
Require that personnel 
working around flight hardware 
be instructed and certified 
in work procedures to 
prevent flight systems dam.age. 
I'/here possible, install 
removable work platform items 
prior to positioning platform 
at work station. 
.~~ 
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Accident/Incident 
Description 
173. *During structural modi-
fications on top level 
of a mobile service 
tower, molten slag from 
a cutting torch became 
imbedded in the s~ro­
fow sandWich wall o.f 
the environmental enclo-
sure causing delayed 
ignition of the wall 
while the workers were 
absent. for lunch. Fire 
hydrants were not 
connected at that level 
and CO2 extinguishers failed to put out fire. 
After burning for half 
an hour, the fire was 
extinguished by station 
fir~men after hoses were 
pulled up from ~ ground 
le'/e 1 hydrant. Thi s mi s-
hap resulted in major 
damage to the facility. 
SECTION III 
FACILITY/aSE SYSTEMS 
Causes 
Inadequate work control 
procedures in that the con-
tractor failed to enforce 
adequate fire preventive 
procedures 1urlng welding/ 
cutting operations and 
failed to provid~ proper 
training for his workers. 
Contributing were contractor 
failure to station a watch-
man i~ the work area when 
the torch cutting operations 
were suspended and manage-
ment failure in not ensuring 
that the service tower 
water system had been 
connected to the station 
water supply prior to opera-
tions on the tower. 
*This mishap was not associated with manned 
space programs; however, it was consIdered 
significant enough in terms of amount of. 
loss and lessons learned to include in 
this summary. 
Recommended 
Preventive/Corrective 
Action 
Designate all operations 
which use welding/cutting 
torches or electrodes as 
hazardous. Require fire 
safety inspection of all 
welding operations prior 
to commencement. Ensure 
that work control procedures 
provide for implementation of 
fire safety precautions, such 
as use of asbestos blankets 
to catch sparks and molten 
slag, and/or briefing and/or 
certification of workers on 
hazardous operations. Require 
a fire watchman to be posted 
during breaks and lunch 
period and for a minimum of 
one hour following operation 
shut down in all areas where 
welding/cutting operations 
are underway near flight 
systems. 
--.l 
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67. 
Accident/Incident 
Description 
During fueling of a 
space vehic Ie at a 
test facil1 ty, h,ydrazine 
fuel was inadvertently 
pumped from the storage 
tank through the waste 
pond rather than into 
the vehicle's fuel tank. 
While using an acetylene 
torch to loosen rusted 
strap hold-down nuts on 
a hydrogen trailer, 
workmen discovered two H2 cylinders still held 
over 2000 psi pressure. 
No mishap occurred, but 
the risk of explosion 
was great. 
During a manufacturing 
leak check of a fuel 
system ball check valve, 
leak test compound was 
drawn 'into the ball 
valve's actuating cylinder 
through a .vent port, 
resulting ;in removal, 
cleaning, reinstalh,tion 
and retesting of the 
valve. 
SECTION IV 
FUEL/PROPELLANT SYSTEMS 
Causes 
Personnel error in which 
a technician failed to close 
the fuel dump valve in 
accordance with operating 
procedures although he and 
QC verified that it was 
closed on the work sign-
off sheet. 
Personne 1 error. C'y linder s 
were inspected and erroneously 
tagged as inert. Contributing 
was inadequate work control 
in that during a subsequent 
inspection, the torch was 
allowed to be used before 
inspection was completed. 
Personnel error in that 
technician failed to exercise 
proper cal:'e in carrying out 
leak test procedures. 
Recommended 
Preventive/Corrective 
Action 
Implement safety training 
and aw~eness programs to 
motivate all personnel 
to be espeCially attentive 
to comply with all work 
control nrocedures in 
hazardous operations. 
Require formal safety approval 
before torchee may be ueed 
near flammable gas producing 
or storage facilities and 
equipment. Require depres-
surization, purging and cer-
tification prior to placing 
inert tage on H cylinders. 
2 
Ensure that leak test 
technicians are adequately 
trained and instructed in 
leak test procedures and 
means to avoid contamination 
of test articles. 
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68. 
69. 
Accident/Incident 
Description 
During manufacturing 
and while performing 
LH..:, propellant valve 
pu~ge flow checks on 
an 0 a.. bu'rner, 9-port~b1e flow meter 
ruptured and was 
destroyed when inadver-
tently subjected to 
excessive pressure due 
to sealed flow meter 
discharge pqrts. Three 
workers sustained minor 
injuries. 
During torque wrench 
tightening of Ii "B" 
nut on a GSE fill/drain/ 
feed line attached to 
a spacecraft oxidizer 
fill/drain/feed line l 
the feed line buckled 
due to overstress 
caused by leverage of 
tbe torquing operation. 
SECTION IV 
FUEL/PROPELLANT SYSTEM! 
Causes 
Personnel error in that 
techniCian failed to check 
the flowmeter discharge 
ports, which were sealed 
with threaded B-nut caps. 
Contributi.ng was a design 
deficiency in that no 
inlet low pressur~ relief 
valve was provided in the 
flowmeter configuration. 
Deficient assembly pro-
cedures in that off-vehicle 
assembly of the GSE fill/ 
drain line could have been 
accomplished prior to connec-
tion to flight hardware. 
Recommended 
Preventive/Corrective 
Action 
Require that portable flow-
meter installation and 
checkout proc~dures include 
caution and warning notes 
about removing seals or 
caps from discharge ports; 
require checklist verification 
of test set-up prior to 
initiation of test. Where 
possible l provide for and 
require the use of relief. 
valves in portable flowmeter 
installations. 
Avoid assembly of GSE 
lines after attachment to 
flight systems; require a 
bench assembly to the point 
of GSE/flight hardware 
interface. 
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Accident/Incident 
Descr1ption 
Five personnel were 
exposed to toxic 
nitrogen tetroxide fumes 
when ~ vapor cloud 
was in~dvertently releas-
ed without warning during 
oxidizer loading opera-
tions in ~n adjacent work 
area 150 feet directly 
upwind of their work 
area. 
During checkout of fuel 
vent quick d1sconnect 
hose assemblies, a fuel 
weigh tank top was blown 
off and attached flex 
hoses, tubing, and gage 
were destroyed. There 
were no injuries. 
SECTION IV 
FUEL/PROPELLANT SYSTEMS 
Causes 
In~dequate work control 
procedures in th~t there 
was lack of .coordination of 
safety responsibilities 
between the two work areas; 
and no "on-site" procedures 
for local evacu~tion of 
individual work areas. 
Persor.nel error in that a 
test valve was incorrectly 
positioned (opened) causing 
overpressurization. Con-
tributing was an inadequate 
checklist which permitted 
bypassing a sequence check, 
and resulted in tank being 
pressurized due to the open 
valve. 
Recommended 
Preventive/Corrective 
Action 
Establishl procedures for 
assignment of responsi-
bility for overall safety 
of all hazardous operations 
between all potential hazard 
areas. Ensure that all 
hazardous areas have an 
effective evacuation plan 
consistent with the type 
or types of emergency potential. 
DeSignate all fuel system 
checkouts as hazardous. 
Require safety review/analysis 
of procedures and checklists 
to ensure adequacy of 
caution and warning notes, 
and to identify safe 
sequence of operations. Require 
that checklists be followed with-
out deviation whenever 
fuel tanking and detanking 
operations take place • 
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AcCIdent/IncIdent 
DescrI:QtIon 
DurIng preparatIon for 
test fIrIng of a 
spacecraft ·system 
engIn~ a fuel (helium 
saturated aerozine-50) 
auxiliary conditioning 
unit (ACU) electrical 
heater assembly on the 
test stand ruptured, due 
to auto-ignition of fuel 
vapor within the heater 
case, r~sultlng in minor 
ACU and test stand damage, 
and inhalation by nearby 
workmen of toxic fuel 
vapor created by the 
rupture. The rupture' 
occurred after the heater 
unit had been turned on 
but prior to start of fuel 
flow. 
SECTION IV 
FUE~PROPELLANT SYSTEMS 
Causes 
Deficient test GSE design 
in that the heater used 
(calrod immersion type) per-
mitted direct contact between 
the heater elements and ~ 
flammable liquid; the heater 
orientation within the ACU 
created a high point vapor 
trap thus exposing some of 
the heater elements to fuel 
vapor; the design provided no 
electrical interlock to 
preclude energizing the heater 
prior to starting the fuel 
circulat1ng pump; the heater 
controls were placed in such 
a configuration that they did 
not reflect the true tempera-
ture within the heating unit. 
Contributing was a deficiency 
within the test procedures that 
permitted energizing heater 
coils before c1rculation of 
fuel was established in the 
test sequence. 
Recommended 
PreventIve/Corrective 
Action 
Require the use of a 
non-hazardous intermediate 
heat transfer fluid such 
as water to separate 
hazardous fluids from 
direct contact with heating 
elements. Require safety 
review/an~lysls of hazard-
ous test procedures to 
verify compatibility between 
procedures and test set-up, 
and to identify safe 
procedural sequencing. 
---J 
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Accident/Incident 
Descripti~on 
During replacement of a 
millipore teflon filter 
in an aerozine-50 fuel 
system, the element 
burst into"fla.me as 
it was placed on the 
f~lter plate. The re-
sulting fire was ex-
tinguished with water 
spray. No personnel 
injury. 
During fuel eonditioning 
operation at a test 
facility when the fuel 
inlet line to the pump 
was opened toxic fuel 
spilled onto the ground 
through the outlet 
valve which was in an 
indicated closed position. 
Seventy gallons of fuel 
were pumped out onto the 
ground before the inlet 
line could be closed by 
"scape" Buit procedures. 
SECTION IV 
FUEL/PROPELLANT SYSTEMS 
Causes 
In~dequate QC because ~ 
non-compatible filter was 
used with aerozine-50, 
resulting in ignition of 
the element and the resid-
ual fuel in filter bowl 
assembly. A contributing 
cause was th~ nearly 
identical part n~mbers of 
the correct and incorrect 
filters. 
Inadequate laboratory 
maintenance procedures which 
made the valve handle 
indicate closed when the 
orifice was actually o,en. 
Recommended 
Prevent 1ve/Corr'ect 1ve 
Action 
Require QC verification of 
replacement parts, pr10r to 
ins'~allation, on any fuel 
system to ensure compatibility. 
Ensure that indicating 
valve ~aintenance pro-
ced1)res require functional/ 
visual check of valve 
for proper indication prior 
to release for in~tallation. 
75. 
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Accident/Incident 
Description 
During removal of a 
spacecraft module 
fuel tank assembly 
from a holding fix-
ture during manu-
facturing, the assembly 
contacted the fixture 
and sustained d~age 
to fuel line and 
bellows, due to close 
clearances between 
the tank and the 
holding fixture. 
SECTION IV 
FUEL/PROPELLANT SYSTEMS 
Causes 
Inadequate work planning 
in that a hoist was select-
ed and used to remove the 
tank from a close tolerance 
f1xture. Contributing was 
deficient fixture design due 
to lack of consideration for 
part B removR,l and handling 
clearance. 
Recommended 
Preventive/Corrective 
Action 
Require the use of 
"hydraset" control with 
hoists when removing parts 
from close tolerance fix-
tures. Require manufactur-
ing operations review of 
holding fixtures designs 
to -assure compatibil1 ty 
with parts removal opera-
tions. 
.. 
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Accident/Incident 
Description 
SECTION V 
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEMS 
Causes 
During purging and inspection Personnel error in that the 
of a life support system, ~n cabin ~tmosphere h~d been 
employee entered a sp~cecraftimproperly certified ~s 
cabin with oxygen deficient breath~ble. Contributing 
atmosphere and was rendered W3.E' the erroneOl'S c lassifica-
partl~lly unconeclou5. tion of the inspection pro-
cedure as "no safety h8.Z'3.rd 
involved." 
20. During verlflc'3.tlon Deflclen~ compatibility 
te~~ ~~cedures i~ th~t a 
design HnU..t~t!cm of the 
lif~ support system was 
not recognIzed during pro-
ceduri~s de'.relopment. T}-.i s 
limitation allowed water 
.test of a life support 
system the test was 
premature.ly terminated 
due to failure of an 
oxygen clrcul3.tlon fan/ 
motor within the system 
to start up, c~used by 
corrosion seizure of a 
fan/motor bearing. 
Subsequent investigation 
revealed that the 
corrosion was caused by 
w~ter which had been 
introduced unknowingly 
into the life support 
system o::ygen loop during 
a previous spacecr~ft/ 
life support system 
compatibility test. 
" 
to be introduc~ unknowingly 
through a closed water shut-
off valve (leakage) in the 
system, under conditions 
of test pressure/time ~pan. 
As a consequence, ~vail'.ble 
oxygen loop dry-out proceodures 
used w~en water was knowingly 
introduced into the loop w~re 
not implemented. 
Recommended 
Preventive/Corrective 
Action 
Designate ~ll life support 
system purging operations as 
hazardous. Train and certify 
all personnel involved in 
these operations for their 
jobs. Require s~fety clear-
ance prior to opening and 
entering sealed spacecraft 
hatches. 
Require s'3.fety r-=view/ 
analYSis of safety critical 
systems test procedures 
dur:ng their development, 
to ~ak~ certain that the 
test oper'3.tions will pro-
vide timely remov'3.l of all 
system contamInants that 
may be introdu~ed by the 
test conditions. 
--l 
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Accident/Incident 
Description 
21. During a rehearsal of 
a simulated altitude 
chamber test, a 
ribbon antenna atop a 
mobile life support 
system was cracked 
halfway through. 
22. During manufacturing 
23. 
de - so ldering opera t.ions 
on ECS p.lumbing, Methyl 
. Ethyl Ketone (MEK) used 
as a solvent caught fire. 
No damage·. or inJury. 
During the removal of 
an environmental control 
unit from a flight 
module, a water-glycol 
line on the unit was bent 
~nd subsequently broke 
while being straightened. 
SECTION· V 
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEMS 
Causes 
Design deficiency in that 
the life support system 
thermal cover flap was 
inadequate to prote~t the 
stowed antenna from being 
damaged during the couch 
change-out exercise. 
Procedural in that flammable 
MEK was not prohibited for 
use in soldering operations • 
Contributing was personnel 
error in using a soldering 
iron before th~ solvent was 
completely dry, and super-
visory failure to prevent 
use of a flammable solvent 
near a heat source. 
Inadequate work control 
procedures in that the water-
glycol line was not adequately 
protected. 
Recommended 
Preventive/Corrective 
Action 
Assure that deSign of 
protective covers over 
life-support systems 
provide shielding against 
damage for protruding parts 
of ancillary system components. 
Avoid use of MEK during 
soldering operations. 
, 
Require training and 
certification of personnel 
assigned to remove/install 
equipment in spacecraft, 
to emphasize avoidance of 
equipment damage. Require 
installation of protective 
barriers/blankets and warning 
placards during equipment 
installation and removal. 
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AcCident/Incident 
Description 
24. While att'lching a 3/8" 
water glycol line during 
installation of a flight 
fuel cell simulator, the 
line twisted out of blue-
print configuration before 
reaching torque 'lalue on 
attaching f'B" nut. re-
sulting in removal and 
replacement of the line. 
25. During assembly leak 
test of an ascent stage 
water system, contamina-
tion fluid from a le~ 
meter was pulled into the 
water system lines due to 
omission of a step in the 
test procedure that re-
quired leak meter disconnec-
tion. 
, j, 
SECTION V 
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEMS 
Causes 
Material failure in th3.t 
the B-nut rotated freely, 
but its sleeve was frozen 
to the tube. Contributing 
was inspection failure 
to identify ~he derec~ive 
line prior to installation 
operations~ 
Inadequate work control 
of test operations that led 
to a momentary lapse in 
attention by an experienced 
test team. Contributing 
could have been the lack 
of 3. caution note in the 
procedure at each step 
where leak meters were 
scheduled to be disconnect-
ed. 
Recommended 
Preventive/Corrective 
Action 
Designate fUght systems 
lines safety critical 
items, req~iring QC 
tagging and validation 
during receiving/issue 
actions and prior to 
installation operations. 
Require the use of 
formal procedures/checklists 
during leak test of program 
essential equipment to 
verify proper test sequencing. 
Require safety review of 
leak test procedures to 
provide caution and warning 
notes. 
co 
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Accident/Incident 
Description 
During a space suit 
fan functional checkout, 
as a result of an 
unscheduled test shut-
down, a fan designed for 
use at 10 pSia was in-
advertently run for It 
minutes at full atmospheric 
pressure and potentially 
damaged. There were no 
injuries. 
During post leak test 
disassembly of an 
oxygen purge system 
oxygen regulator a damag-
ed "0" ring seal and 
"delta." ring were found; 
the d~a.ge was due to 
their improper installation 
at the time of regulator 
assembly. . 
SECTION V 
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEMS 
Causes 
Personnel error in that 
there was a failure to follow 
approved. written procedures to 
cut electric power to the fan 
before shutting off the test 
system vacuum pump. 
Deficient procedures govern-
ing regulator assembly/ 
inspection in that there was 
no requirement to verify 
the proper installation of 
the seals during assembly 
operations. 
Recommended 
Preventive/Corrective 
Action 
. Require ~se of checklists 
in conjunction with 
written procedures to 
ensure completion of 
essential steps in test 
sequence of flight systems. 
Require formal manufactur-
ing QC procedures to 
control assembly of non- . 
m~tallic seals and parts; 
require inspection to 
verify their proper in-
stallation during assembly. 
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Accident/Incident 
Description 
During manufacturing 
one sector of a space-
craft sun sensor 
was broken loose 
during removal of its 
protective coyer 
preparatory to painting 
the sensor supporting 
structure. 
SECTION V 
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEMS 
Causes 
Inadequate work control. 
Workman removing the 
cover was not authorized 
or trained to do so. 
Recommended 
Preventive/Corrective 
Action 
Ensure that only tr3.1ned 
and certified workmen 
are used to install and 
remove flight hardware 
and related pro:ectlve 
covers. 
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Acc 1 dentjInc 1 dent 
DeacriE!1on 
SECTION VI 
ORDNANCE SYSTEMS 
Causes 
No Accidents/Incidents pertA.lnlng 
to Ordnance Systems recorded 1n 
the 1970-1971 per1od. 
Recommended 
Preventive/Corrective 
Action 
en 
.;::-
Accident/Incident 
Description 
120. While being proof tested 
to 6000 psig, a stain-
less steel braided flex 
hose in a test fixture 
line ruptured at 3000 
psig. No injuries. 
121. During laboratory test 
evaluation of a regula-
tor, a flowmeter ex-
ploded, injuring two 
technicians. 
122. While being proof tested 
to 6000 psig~ a flex hose 
ruptured at 4000 psig. 
One employee sustained 
minor injury. 
SECTION VII 
PRESSURE SYSTEMS 
Causes 
Personnel error. The hose 
was incorrectly tagged for 
test to 6000 psig, which 
was above its burst rating. 
Contributing was inadequate 
inspection procedures which 
allowed the incorrectly 
tagged hose to be set up 
for test. 
Personnel error because the 
flowmeter outlet diameter had been 
reduced from 1-1/2ft to 1/4n~ 
restricting flow, thus 
causing meter to exceed its 
'design pressure and explode. 
The modification was not 
authorized by approved pro-
G!edures. 
Personnel error. The hose was 
incorrectly tagged with a 
proof pressure that was act-
ually above its burst rating. 
Contributing was inadequate 
inspection procedures which 
allowed the incorrectly 
tagged hose to be set up 
for test. 
Reconunended 
Preventi ve/Col'recti ve 
Action 
Ensure that hose part numbers 
are checked against listed 
pressure ratings prior to 
tagging. Require that pressure 
rating tags be checked against 
part numbers and validated 
prior to proof testing. 
Require standards/procedures 
for laboratory modification of 
high pressure equipment. Re-
quire inspection of high 
pressure equipment modifications 
prior to operation. 
Ensure that hose part numbers 
are checked against listed 
pressure ratings prior to tag-
ging. Require that pressure 
rating tags be ohecked against 
part numbers and validated prior 
to proof testing. Ensure that 
personnel protective equipment 
is adequate in pressure proof 
testing areas; barriers should 
be installed to isolate the 
test set-up. 
co 
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Accident/Incident 
Description 
123. During development and 
qualification testing. 
a facility high pressure 
air line operating at a 
normal 3400 psig pressure 
fa iled at an elbow swage-
lock fitting and caused 
minor damage to the build-
ing fixtures from conse-
quent whipping action. 
124. During operational test-
ing of a space flight 
simulator, a 3000 psi 
hydraulic line pulled out 
of its "B" nut connection 
and sprayed hydraulic 
fluid over a portion of 
the facility. No damage 
or personnel injury. 
SECTION VII 
PRESSURE SYSTEMS 
Causes 
Improper assembly in that a 
reused swagelock fitting did 
not match the type of tubing 
used and was improperly 
fitted. Contributing were 
a design deficiency in that 
the assembly drawings used 
were not approved by quali-
fied engineers; QC failure 
to inspect for proper fit-
tings and workmanship; and 
inadequate t ie-dO\.\'l1 of the 
air line. 
Improper installation of the 
line assembly in that the 
"B" nut was loose, allowing 
pressure on the line to 
straighten out the tube 
flare causing the line to 
blow out from the simulator 
unit. 
Reconunended 
Preventive/Corrective 
Action 
Require certification of per-
sonnel assigned to assemble and 
maintain high pressure systems. 
Ensure that design of high 
pressure systems is performed 
by quslified and experienced 
personnel. Require formal QC 
inspection of high pressure 
systems for compliance with de-
sign specifications prior to 
system activation. Ensure that 
all high pressure hydraulic and 
air lines are secured at 6-foot 
intervals. 
Require formalized procedures to 
inspect and verify pressure 
connections for program simulator 
equipment prior to test commence-
ment. 
en 
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Accident/Incident 
Description 
125. During operational check-
out of a test equipment 
modificat ion in a down 
flow clean room, a 60 psig 
air line was inadvertently 
connected to a vacuum gage 
port, resulting in des-
truction of an absolute 
pressure gage. 
126. During visual inspection of 
a high pressure system in 
a facility supplying gas . 
to test cells, desiccant 
particles were found, re-
sulting in a shut-dm~ of 
the system for investiga-
tions and repair. 
4 
SECTION VII 
PRESSURE SYSTEMS 
Causes 
Procedural due to lack of 
detailed checkout/activation 
procedures and checklists 
and lack of QC certification. 
Contributing were test system 
design deficiencies in lack 
of positive identification 
of inlet and outlet ports 
and lack of an absolute gage 
pressure relief valve. 
Inadequate supply system de·. 
sign in that one of the dry-
ing filters ruptured, caused 
by a normal rapid pressure 
drop on the downstream side 
of the filter, creating a 
venturi, or vacuum, effect. 
Rcconunended 
Preventive/Corrective 
Action 
Require that formalized test 
set-up and operational pro-
cedures be established for acti-
vation/testing of pressure 
s:,1stems which include precaution-
ary warnin::,;s and QC verification. 
Inlet and outlet ports should be 
clearly marked, and designed to 
prevent inadvertent cross connect-
ions. Require installation of 
pressure relief devices on all 
pressure gages. 
Require that pressure systems 
used in test of flight hardware 
be designed with sensing and re-
lief devices to detect pressure 
variations and protect critical 
filters in the system; support 
design development with system 
safety analyses/reviews. 
en 
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Accident/Incident 
Description 
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127. While operating the purge 
and vacuum console during 
pre-launch checkout, the 
operator turned the regu-
lator clockwise instead 
of cOlUlter-clockwise. re-
suI t ing in overpressur iza-
tion of' the system. No 
damage resulted. 
128. During vehicle assembly at 
a latDlch facility, a heliwn 
control system solenoid 
va 1 ve on an engine was 
found to have four radial 
scratches across the out-
let port sealing surface. 
The valve was rejected 
from service. 
SECTION VII 
PRESSURE SYSTEMS 
Causes 
Personnel error in that the 
technician turned the regu-
lator in the opposite di-
rection from that called 
out in the test procedure. 
Personnel error. Failure to 
carry out the required com-
plete inspection of the valve 
during source inspection. 
Reconunended 
Preventive/Corrective 
Action 
Ensure that test operators are 
certified and trained in 
pressure system adjustment 
techniques. Require caution 
and warning notes in test pro-
cedures governing pressure 
control adjustments. Use 
directional decals/placards on 
test consoles to indicate proper 
adjustments. 
Require the use for formal 
checklists during source in-
spection of program critical 
equipment to verify completion 
of all elements of the in-
spection sequence. 
~ 
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Accident/Incident 
Description 
129. During oxygen sampling of 
the crew umbilical system 
of an altitude chamber, a 
GOX hose was erroneously 
disconnected, pressurizing 
the hose to 173%. of design 
burst level. The hose did 
not fail and there was no 
damage or injury. 
130. \'lhile investigating 
apparent nonoperation 
bf a gas generator blade 
valve during system check-
out t employee had finger 
amputated when the valve 
was suddenly activated by 
an operator at a remote 
location. 
SECTION VII 
PRESSURE SYSTEMS 
Causes 
Des ign deficiency in that 
interconnect hose fittings 
contained a self-sealing 
valve \l7hich caused the hose 
pressure to increase above 
deSign burst level follow-
ing inadvertent disconnect. 
Contributing was a pro--
cedural error in disconnect-
ing the line while still 
pressurized. 
Failure to follow approved 
safety precautions in that 
the employee had not informed 
the engineer in charge of 
valve activation that he was 
working on the valve; there 
was no continuing communication 
between the remote operator and 
the workman, and no lock-out 
procedures to prevent valve 
activation. 
Recommended 
Preventive/Corrective 
Action 
Review design standards for LOX 
and GOX hose connections to en-
sure the prevention of 
bose overpressurization follow-
ing inadvertent disconnect. Re-
quire check-off verification of 
depressurization prior to all 
hose disconnects. 
Require that system trouble-
shooting operations be approved 
by the engineer \'1ith functional 
control authority over the system 
prior to conmencement. Ensure 
that system controls are "locked 
out" either mechanically or with 
warning tag while the system is 
being worked on. Ensure positive 
communication between employees 
working on systems at remote 10--
cations and operators and engineers 
in charge of system activation. 
OJ 
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Accident/Incident 
Description 
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131. During leak check of a 
test pressure container, 
the burst disc of the 
container ruptured due 
to overpressure caused 
by incomplete closing of 
the manual test gas valve, 
resulting in minor injury 
(ear drum damage) to three 
wor]Qnen. 
132. During pressure adjust-
ment to reseal a mercury 
sealed piston in a flow 
rate calibrator, a 
pressure gage on the 
test bench exploded due 
to inadvertent applica-
tion of overpressure 
fran the suPply source, 
resulting in injury to a 
test technician (shattered 
tempered glass dial cover 
showered face and upper 
body with glass fragments). 
SECTION VII 
PRESSURE SYSTEMS 
Causes 
Inadequate test set-up de-
sign in that the test gas 
system contained no relief 
valve or pressure regula-
tion within the safe work-
ing pressure of the test 
article. Contributing 
was the failure to follow 
procedures in that closure 
of the test gas valve was 
not verified. 
Inadequate test bench de-
sign in that there was no 
automatic pressure relief 
device between the exploded 
gage and the supply source; 
the exploded gage had no 
safety shield; and there 
was no pressure gage to in-
dicate the amount of pressure 
applied to the calibrator. 
Contributing was inadequate 
work control in that pressure 
. valve/regulating devices on 
the test bench were positioned 
without authorization during 
the resealing operations. 
Recommended 
Preventive/Corrective 
Action 
Require installation of pressure 
regulators and relief devices in 
test pressurization systems when 
source pressure exceeds safe work-
ing pressures of pressurized con-
tainers. Require positive veri-
fication of pressure application/, 
isolation valves positioning during 
application of test pressures 
through QC and/or supervisory 
checklists. 
Require installation of pressure 
relief devices on all pressure 
gages and at other critical loca-
tions in test pressure systems. 
Require installation of pressure 
gages in maintenance/test set-ups 
to indicate applied pressures at 
work stations. Require installa-
tion of safety lenses on test bench 
pressure gages. placard test 
pressure systems for operation 
by authorized personnel only • 
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Accident/Incident 
Description 
133. A helium cylinder located 
in. a K-bottle facility 
storage rack suddenly 
burst and released "all of 
its contents as a result 
of a ruptured disc in the 
valve assembly. 
134. During operational test and 
checkout of a spacecraft, a 
~ter glycol quick-disconnect 
(QD) was mated to the wrong 
port. There was no damage 
since the system was not 
pressurized. The spacecraft 
was tested for contamination 
and the flight half of the 
QD was changed. . 
<I 
~ECTION VII 
PRESSURE SYSTEMS 
Causes 
Inadequate storage proce-
dures in that the K-bottle 
storage rack was located 
under a translucent sheet 
roof which allowed sun's 
rays to overheat/over-
pressurize the cylinders. 
Inadequate procedures .due 
to the lack of warning notes 
in test and hook-up checklist. 
Contributing was inadequate 
design in that the QD con-
figuration was such that it 
could be rrated to a wrong 
port. 
Recommended 
Preventive/Corrective 
Acti.on 
Ensure K-bottle storage proce-
dures require sheltered storage 
to protect bottles from over-
pressurization from heat sources. 
Provide warning notes in pro-
cedures and checkli.sts \l7here it 
is poss ible to make wrong connec-
tions. Require QC verification 
of all flight systems test set-
ups. Ensure that adjacent coimec-
tors are properly coded, marked, 
or sized to avoid mismating. 
" 
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Accident/Incident 
Description 
:tl 
135. During run-in of a high 
pressure air compressor 
used for laboratory test-
ing of flight hard\'lBre, the 
fifth stage oil separator 
of the compressor exploded, 
due to autogenous ignition 
of an oil/air mixture in 
the exit pipe, propelling 
.fra~nts of the separator 
throughiout the builclin~ 
and through the walls and 
roof. No one was injured. 
SECTION VII 
PRESSURE SYSTEMS 
Causes 
Deficient desi~ of air 
compressor system in that 
automatic cut-of£ tempera-
ture sensors were so located 
that they could not detect 
the temperature of the dis-
charged air at the area of 
the explosion. T~1e temper-
ature approached lmOoF lIDder 
run-in conditions, the 
approximate autozeneous 
point of the 'nineral based 
lubricatinz oil used in 
the CG~pressor system 
under maximum stage dis-
charge pressure. 
Recommended 
Preventive/Corrective 
Action 
Require hazard analyses to be 
performec on laboratory/ 
facility pressure equipment 
which is used \.,ith flight hard-
wal~ prior to operations and 
require safety approval. Speci-
fy LIse of synthetic lubricants 
in place of mineral base oils 
when potential .operating tem-
peratures may exceed 350°F. 
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Acc1dent/Inc1dent 
Description 
136. During preparation for an 
underwater test in a test 
facility, a sealed battery 
box conta,ining two lead-
acid batteries was being 
pressurized to 'approximately 
10 psi from a 110 psi source 
when the box blew up due to 
overpressurizatian, resulting 
in battery breakage. There 
was: no personnel injury or 
unacceptable tank contami-
nation. 
SECTION VII 
PRESSURE SYSTEMS 
Causes 
Inadequate design of pressure 
source system .in that t;1ere 
was no pressure regulating or 
relief device between the 
110 psi supply and the connec-
tion to the battery box. Con-
tributing was management 
failure to implement formal 
design control of the battery 
box in that the box t-:as a 
"locally fabricated it:em TT 
with no identification of 
safe working pressures. 
Also contributing \'las a pro-
cedural error in that, al-
though the box was equipped 
with a shut-off valve and a 
gage, the valve was either 
open when the 110 psi source 
was connected or it was 
opened too fast: during 
pressurization. 
Recommended 
Prevent1ve/Corrective 
Action 
Require installation of pressure 
rerrulators and automatic relief 
devices in source lines when 
source pressures exceed safe 
working pressure of pl"essure re-
ceivers in test pressurization 
systems. Require formal design 
control of all pressurized con-
tainers used in tests. Label 
pressurized containers with safe 
working pressures and periodic 
proof pressure test require~ts. 
Require the use of formal 
procedures/checklists for the 
proper sequencing of operatiom 
in pressure applications. 
" 
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Accident/Incident 
Description 
137. During proof pressure test-
ing of a coolant serv ic ing 
WI it , a flowmeter within 
the unit ruptured due to 
overpressure and showered 
glass fragments within 
the enclosed test area. 
There were no injuries 
or ather damage. 
138. During operational test 
and checkout flow testing 
of a spacecraft reaction 
control system engine, 
pressurization of the 
system caused leakage in 
an oxidizer isolation 
valve, which went unob-
served unt 11 the oxidizer 
propellant tanks were 
pressurized to 20 pSig, 
approximately 4~ of de-
sign burst. There was 
no damage and no in-
juries. 
SECTION VII 
PRESSURE SYSTEMS 
Causes 
The test procedures required 
application of 460 psig 
pressure even though the 
flowmeter wa. rated for a 
safe maximum working press-
ure of only 230 psig. 
Inadequate test procedures 
in that the procedures failed 
to sufficiently recognize the 
possibility of pressure leak-
age through the oxidizer 
isolation valve and over-
pressurization of the oxi-
dizer tanks during the 
test sequence. 
Reconunended 
Preventive/Corrective 
Action 
Require checklist verification 
that test pressure requirements 
are within safe operating limits 
of test equipment. Limit proof 
pressure tests to 1.5 times 
maximum safe working·pressure 
of test equipment. Ensure that 
proof pressure requirements for 
an assembly are compatible with 
assembly components during de-
velopment of test procedures. 
Identify all tests requiring 
pressure applications to flight 
systems as hazardous; require 
safety review/analysis of test 
procedures during their devel-
opment, to ensure entry of re-
quired caution and warning notes~ 
and safe test sequencing. 
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Accident/Incident 
Description 
139. During acceptance testing 
of an APS module, the 
module bellows assembly 
was permanently distorted 
due to the application of 
test pressure approximately 
130 psi above the maximum 
allowable. The bellows 
assembly had to be replaced. 
" 
SECTION VII 
PRESSURE SYSTEMS 
Causes 
Personnel failure to pro-
perly position valves as 
required by the test pro-
cedure. Contrihut ing 
was lack of requirements 
for positive verification 
and communication of 
correct positioning of 
valves during the test 
sequence. 
Recommended 
Preventive/Corrective 
Action 
DeSignate flight hardware 
pressure testing operations as 
hazardous. Require safety re-
vi~" and analysis of such op-
erations to identify potential 
hazards. Institute positive 
communication and verification 
procedures for all configuration 
changes required during test 
operations. Require a "dry run" 
to validate proposed pressure 
test procedures for critical 
flight hardware. 
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Accident/Incident 
Descri;R.tion 
27. Durine a manufacturing 
check-valve verifica-
tion leak test on a 
space vehicle propulsion 
system, a technician 
working on the vehicle, 
using a drill motor, 
slipped and nicked a 
fuel line which was 
under test. 
23. During cleanup of a minor 
fuel leak from a pressure 
regulator in a propulsion 
system valve box, several 
pol~'propylene felt clean-
up pads were slightly 
charred. No damage or 
injuries resulted. 
SECTION VIII 
PROPULSION SYSTEMS 
Causes 
Inadequate work area cO!1trol. 
The leak test was be ing per-
formed in a limited access 
area and test procedures re-
quired no work on the vehicle 
during test operations. Con-
tributing was personnel error 
in use of the dr ill. 
Personnel error in that tech-
nician failed to follow esta-
blished procedures, since 
clean-up pads were not 
sufficiently water-dampened 
prior to being used to 
absorb fuel. 
Recommended 
Preventive/Corrective 
Action 
Require supervisory and QC 
verification of work area 
clearance prior to initiation 
of test operations in limited 
access test areas. Ensure 
that using personnel are 
trained and L~structed in 
the proper use and position-
ing of drill motors in the 
vicinity of pressurized 
lines and tanks. 
Designate all fuel clean-up 
operations as hazardous. Re-
quire all personnel involved 
in fuel clean-up to be trained 
and certified for their job. 
::11,11 
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Accident/Incident 
Description 
29. Dttrinr; removal of engine 
from test stand afte'r com-
pletion.ofdevelopment 
test fir in~, three tech-
nicians inl'ulled toxic 
aerozine-.SO fuel vapors 
that had been entrapped in 
the engine and discharged 
at the en.gine corinect 
point. 
30. Nhile removiIlgan engine 
LOX inl:et duct dur ing man-
ufactUring assembly opera-
tions ,. water in the bellows 
convolutions puured into 
the LOX turbo pump, nece'ssi-
tating removal and recondi-
tioning of the 'pwnp. 
" 
SECTION VIII 
PROPULSION SYSTEMS 
Causes 
Inadequate Nork control pro-' 
cedures in that the tecfL."1i-
cians \.;erenot wearing' pro-
per protective clothing f.or 
this type activity in . 
which residual fuel and 
oxidizer vapors can be 
expected even after engine 
purging operatian~. 
Inadequate inspection since 
the weep holes of the inlet 
duct and the shroud of the 
. pump bell housing had not 
been covered and sealed as 
required, thus the collar 
area of the inlet duct per-
mitted water to remain 
trapped below weep holes 
of. the duct. 
Reconunended 
Preventive/Corrective 
Action 
Establish \\'Ork control pro-
.cedures which define the proper 
protective clothing to be worn 
forremova'i of liquid propel-
lImt engine6 from test stands 
after .they have been operated. 
Require use of checklists in 
perfol"l'ltance of assembly in-
spectiOns to record and verify 
that all inspection steps have 
been carried·Out. 
'. 
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Accident/Incident 
Descri~tion 
31. . Dul."'ing installation of a 
spacecraft propulsion en-
gine, the railiilg of the 
engine stand pressed up 
aga"inst a fuel vent line 
and dented.it~ 
32. During instrwnent modi-
fication work on a space-
craft engine. a welding 
machine .operator mis-
interpreted a voice 
communication from the 
interstage area and 
applied power to the 
tube ~ding head while-
it was .in contact with 
the engine work plat-
form, shorting the head 
to the platform. No 
damage to the engine; 
however, the potential 
existed. 
SECTION VIII 
PROPULSION SYSTEMS 
Causes 
ProCedural deficiency in 
that there was failure. to 
communicate essential in-
formation concerning change 
:in engine configurat ion to 
inst~latian personnel; 
this particular engine had 
its fuel vent line routed 
5 inches lower than in pre-
vious engines, and the 
pneumatic--tired stand 
raised up when pavt of 
wovking load was removed. 
Inadequate work control in 
that there was a failure to 
provide adequate communica-
tiOns between the interstage 
and the welding operator. 
Reconunended 
Preventive/Corrective 
Action 
Ensure that installation/test 
procedures used in conjunction 
with pneumatic-tired work 
stands proVide cautionary warn-
ings to make allowances in 
stand.s T height due to load. 
Require hardline voice/v isual 
communications amon~ welding 
team members on flight sys-
tems. Require review of com-
munication techniques prior 
to start of welding operations. 
Require safety approval of 
welding setup. Ensure that 
welding machine operators and 
technicians are certified and 
instructed in procedural com-
munication techniques. -
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Accident/Incident 
Description 
33. During removal and re-
placement of booster 
engine LH? prevalves, 
a prevalve spacer was 
scratched in three 
places. 
34. During "helium systere 
leak test pre-static 
engine checkout at an 
assembly facility, a 
growing bubble le~ 
was detected at the 
mating flanges of the 
heat exchanger helium 
supply duct and the 
helium supply wrap 
around duct, resulting 
in replacement of the 
seal. 
35. During maintenance in-
stallation of a replace-
ment O-ring on an engine 
igniter fuel line, four 
O-rings were found cre~sed 
in their package, result-
ing in rejectivn for use. 
.. 
SECTION VIII 
PROPULSION SYSTEr~S 
Causes 
Inadequat;e maintenance and 
installation procedures. Con-
tributing causes were inade-
quate supervision and per-
sonnel error. 
Personnel fa~lure tc ro~low 
established installation 
procedures/techniques in that 
80 degrees of the seal's 
teflon coating had be~n peel-
ed orf as a result of improper 
installation. 
Inadequate/improper 
packaging s~nce procedures 
called for the O-rings to be 
packed so that theJ" would 
remain in their natural 
shape. Contributing was ir.-
ad'~qL:ate inspection of 
packaged products. 
Recommended 
Preventive/Corrective 
Action 
Require that all personnel 
be certified for work or. 
flight hardware a~d require 
that specific installatio~ 
procedures are prepared 
and followed. 
Re<p ire that critical 
component installation 
proce1ures be unders:oon 
and that personnel are 
trained and certifiej ':"0 
perform such operations. 
Ensure that inspection 
procedures and checklists 
provide for specific check-
offs, as appropr.i.ate, during 
installation of cri~ical 
components on flight 
hardware. 
Ensure that packaging a~d 
packaging inspection 
personnel are +:rained. and 
cArtified in p~oper 
pa~ka.giJ"g tec'lriquesj 3.nd 
the use of approved. 
p~ckaging proc~dures. 
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Accident/Incident 
Description 
36. During manufacturing 
checkout leak test of 
an engine hydraulic 
system, the braided 
flex hose connected 
to the gimbal filt~r 
m~nlfold supply 
pressure tap leaked at 
a severely damaged 
area resulting in re-
placement of the hose. 
37. During engine develop-
ment testing a circuit 
malfunction ir. the 
facility cutout system 
led to premature ~nglne 
cut-off. No damage. 
SECTION VIII 
PROPULSION SYSTEMS 
Causes 
Inadequat~ pre-~est in-
spection procedures in ~hat 
the failed hose was i11 an 
inc1p1ent failure condition, 
that could have been detect-
ed by visual inspection 
(damaged braid and permanent 
bulge set). 
Personnel error. The thrust 
chamber exit igniter indica"-
tion devic~ waE inadverte~tly 
wired into the cutout system, 
there was no evidence that 
test wire connections had 
bee~ inspected. 
II~I 
Recommended 
Preventive/Corrective 
Action 
Require formal QC inspection 
and verification of 
test pressure set-ups 
before application of test 
pressures to or around 
progrrun essential equip-
ment. 
Require formal qc inspec-
tion and verification of 
test wiring connections 
prior to ~pplication of 
power to program essential 
equipment. 
..... 
o 
o 
Accident/Incident 
Description 
38. An engine injector be-
came contaminated with 
rain water while in its 
storage contai~er in a 
storage warehouse due to 
a leak in the building 
roof and lack of cover 
on the storage container. 
39. During a flight engine 
pre-stage checkout 
inspection following 
removal from storage, it 
was discovered that 
there was minor damage 
to the thrust chamber 
tubes, requiring repair • 
. " 
SECTION VIII 
PROPULSION SYSTEMS 
Causes 
Personnel error in that 
the stor~ge container cover 
had b~en removed to inspect 
the condition of the con-
tainer dessicant ~~d had 
not been replaced. Contribut-
ing was a management deficien-
cy in that there was a 
failure to have proper tuilding 
inspection to detect roofing 
deterioration. 
Inadequate storage 
inspection proced~res since 
the.protective engine cover 
had not been installed, and 
the stage was dam.aged when 
struck by some sharp object. 
Recommended 
Preventive/Corrective 
Action 
Ensure tt1a: program hard-
ware inspect.ion procedures 
require immediate replace-
ment of ~rotec~ive coverings 
when inspection is completed; 
require use of "buddy 
system" and checklist 
verifi~atio~ when inspec-
tion~ are performed in 
isolated. areas. Req'..lire 
pre-storage inspection of 
storage ~acilities for 
program eSSential equip-
ment to ens~re they will 
provide the required pro-
tectio.1; .'l:1.d oerform 
periodic (at ieast quarterly) 
inspection and corrective 
maintenance. 
Require forrr.al procedures 
and checklists to verify 
installation of protective 
covers on flight hardware 
placed in storage. 
..... 
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Acc1dent/lnc1dent 
Description 
40. During a leak check 
procedure on a space-
craft propulsion 
system during assembly 
operation, the over-
head workstand was 
moved while ~ propul-
sion flex line was 
still attached to 
it, causing damage to 
a 11ne connector 
and mount1ng bracket. 
41. During installation of 
a tube assembly on a 
spacecraft engine, a 
tube weld purge could 
not be accomplished. 
Inspect ion revealed a 
piece of plastic film 
plugging the tube pass-
age. 
SECTION VIII 
PROPULSION SYSTEMS 
Causes 
Inadequate work control 
in that the workstand was 
not cleared of f1exline 
connections before being 
moved. Contributing was 
personnel error since the 
incident was partly due 
to carelessness during the 
test procedures. 
Deficient inspection pro-
cedures governing process-
ing of plugged tube from 
manufacturer to point of 
installation, in that plas-
tic film was used to protect 
tube ends, and its presence 
in the tube was undetected 
in its process through an 
undetermined number of 
shipping/receiving points; 
there were no procedures 
to verify the internal 
cleanliness of the tube 
~diately prior to in-
stallaticn • 
Recommended 
Preventive/Corrective 
Action 
Use formal procedures 
and checklists during 
assembly/test of flight 
systems to verify completion 
of all operations prior 
to movement of workstands. 
Require formal QC inspection! 
verification of cleanliness 
of internal tube/piping areas 
immediately prior to installa-
tion in flight systems. 
:: 
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Accident/Incident 
Description 
21. Following removal of a 
protective hard-floor 
covering during manufact-
ure of a flight module, 
the module floor \,las 
fotmd to have a one and 
a half inch long tri-
angular puncture. 
22. During \'leight and balance 
testing of a spacecraft 
in a manufacturing facility, 
the turn buckle on the 
sling being hooked to the 
top of the craft contacted 
the craft and broke off a 
finger seaL 
23. While performing work on 
top level platform of a 
spacecraft module, a 
torque wrench slipped 
fran technician's hand. 
falling and striking aft 
bulkhead structure, 
causing a 1/16 inch nick. 
. " 
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SECTION IX 
STRUCTURAL SYSTEMS 
Causes 
r-Iost probable cause \'las per-
sonnel error in allowing 
the hinged hard floor 
supporting frame to fall 
against the module floor 
during either installation 
or removal. 
Inadequate work control since 
one leg of the sLing \.,as not 
pulled taut enough to prevent 
the sling from contacting and 
breaking off the finger seal. 
Contributing \I]as failure to 
provide required protection 
for the finger seal. 
Inadequate work control pro-
cedures in that there were 
no protective or restraining 
devices used to prevent a 
slipped wrench from falling. 
" I 
Recommended 
Preventive/Corrective 
Action 
Require training and certifi-
cation of IE rsonnel involved 
in installation of protective 
flight module coverings. 
Require any in-plant movement 
of flight rardware to be under 
the direct supervision of a 
designated move conductor. 
Ensure that required protect-
ive devices are used. 
Require the use ~f protective 
nets or restraining devices 
on tools being used on elevated 
work platforms. 
...... 
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Accident/Incident 
Description 
24. During the lifting of a 
launch vehicle section, 
a hold-down bolt in the 
aft support structure 
over-sn-essed the ve-
hicle's aft skirt 
section, resulting :in 
minor damage. 
25. During manufactur:ing, a 
titanium propellant tank 
\'las undergoing final 
internal inspection by 
means of an X-ray anode 
tube which was left in-
side the tank unattended. 
Overnight, a leak devel-
oped at a hose connection 
in the X-ray tube cooling 
system which half-filled 
the tank with water, 
collapsing and totally 
destroy:ing it. 
SECTION IX 
STRUCTURAL SYSTEMS 
Causes 
Personnel error in that the 
bolt was not removed 85 re-
quired prior to lifting. 
Contributing was improper 
inspect ian in that several 
inspection teams had certi-
fied that all bolts \'1eI'e 
removec.. 
Inadequate \,"ork procedure5 in 
that cooling system hoses were 
not checked for proper install-
ation since a kinked hose 
caused a pressure buildup 
which resulted in the hose 
backing off the nipple. Con-
tributing causes were a de-
sign deficiency in using ad-
hesive tape on ~ose connec-
tions to restrain hose from 
pulling loose; and a manage-
ment deficiency in that the 
tank manufacturer failed to 
follow instructions of the 
contractor to remove the x-
ray tube from the tank when-
ever it was to be left un-
attended • 
Recommended 
Preventive/Corrective 
Action 
Ensure that inspection per-
sonnel are qualified and certi-
fied for their specific job. 
Ensure that hold-down bolt 
removal procedures and check-
lists identify and req~ire veri-
fication of the nwnber of bolts 
re'l1oved. 
Require that QC verify proper 
installation of test equipment 
used ,'lith critical hardware. 
Prohibit the use of test equip-
ment which does not use mechani-
cal hose clamps for all hose 
connections. Require use of a 
checklist to ensure correct 
procedures for shutdown of test/ 
inspection opera,ions on program 
critical hardware. 
...... 
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Accident/Incident 
Description 
26. During co:.mtdm'lIl demon-
stration test at a launch 
facility, the spacecraft 
boost protective cover 
(BPC) hatch latches die. 
not retract prior to hatch 
closure, resulting in 
minor damage to npc. 
27. llJhile ra1smg the hydraul-
.ic \V'o:::,k platform around 
the spacecraft, the kick 
·plate oame in contact \'iit:-, 
the spacecraft tunnel, 
causing a 2" tear in tile 
lOtV'er edge of the tunnel 
door. 
28. During manufacturing, a 
spacecraft side hatch \V'8S 
closed on and crushed a 
live portable light cord, 
resulting in arcing which 
burnt two small indel1tations 
on the hatch frame ledge • 
• 
SECTION IX 
STRUCTURAL SYSTEHS 
Causes 
Inadequate procedures in 
that test procedures did not 
call for verification, vis-
ually or otherwise, that 
hatch latches were in open 
position. 
Inadequate supervision and 
work cmtrol in that a 
visual inspection for de-
termining adequate clear-
ances for the platform was 
not made before and during 
the raising operation. 
Personnel error in that a 
technician failed to remove 
the light cord before closing 
the side ha tch. 
Recommended 
Preventive/Corrective 
Action 
Ensure that test procedures re-
quire positive verification of 
positioned devices during test 
sequence. 
Require that two men always be 
assigned to raise or lower any 
\'10rkstand; one man to operate 
the raising or lowering mech-
anism, and one man to assure 
hardware clearance. 
Require supervisbry or inspection 
approval prior to opening or 
closing spacecraft hatches. In-
stall restraints on open hatch 
doors to prevent inadvertent 
closing. 
f-' 
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Accident/Incident 
Description 
29. During manufacturing assembly 
ope1'8t ions, a stage tank was 
subjected to possible negative 
pressure differential and 
damage, due to failure to 
uncap the breather port of 
the tank desiccant canister 
following canister connect-
ion to the tank. 
30. During the horizontal paint 
and rolling operation on a 
stage tank, a temporarily 
secured flange became loose 
and fell inside the forward 
skirt area, resulting in 
minor damage to mylar on 
forward dome and a small 
ding in a thermo-conditioning 
system 1 ine. 
SECTION IX 
STRUCTURAL SYSTEMS 
Causes 
Inadequate work control pro-
cedures since the canister 
was both disconnected and 
reconnected to the tank with-
out documented authority or 
procedural instructions; as 
a result, the mechanic making 
the reconnect ion failed to 
uncap the breather port. 
Inadequate inspection proce-
dures in that after the des-
iccant system had been re-
installed following tank 
pressurization for an engine 
leak check, the temporary 
flange was imprcp!rly stowed 
inside the tank. 
Recommended 
Preventive/Corrective 
Action 
Require the use of formal pro-
cedures and checklists to attain 
and verify the proper configura-
tion of flight equipm ent during 
all assembly operations. 
Require accountability for all 
equipment and tools upon the 
completion of specialized opera-
tions involving flight hardware. 
Require inspection and certifi-
cation when any item has been 
stowed temporarily on flight 
hardware. 
~ i 
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Accident/Incident 
Description 
31. During test preparation. 
a control handle fell off 
an overhead hydraulic hoist 
and punctured a spacecraft 
bulkhead, allowing Bpproxi-
mately a gallon of hydraulic 
fluid to spill on the bulk-
head and leak onto equipment 
inside. The long range 
effects of the fluid con-
tmnination are lUlknowIl. 
32. During manufacturing test 
preparation, the floor skin 
of a flight module was torn 
when a workman dropped one 
end of a crew couch. 
• 
SECTION IX 
STRUCTURAL SYSTEMS 
Causes 
Personnel error in that 
the hoist passed receiving 
inspection with an L~properly 
installed control handle set 
screw. Contributing \'las .lack 
of procedures requiring 
special inspection of flight 
hardware hanQling!lifting 
equipment prior to use. 
Inadequate work control. The 
workman was not experienced 
. or qualified and had not been 
assigned to the job. Con-
tributing was failure to follow 
required procedures since pro-
tective floor pads \o1ere not in 
place. 
Recommended 
Preventive/Corrective 
Action 
" Require QC rece1vmg inspection 
check of control handles in-
stallation on all handling! 
lifting equipment. Require 
local QC inspection and veri-
fication of all handling! 
liftin"g equipment used with 
flight hardware prior to use. 
Designate all transport and 
handling operations involving 
flight equipment as sa.fety cri-
tical and train ano certify per-
sonnel for their job. Ensure 
that only certified personnel 
participate in sclfety critical 
handling ope rat ions. Require 
QC verification that protective 
pads are in place prior to moving 
heavy items inside flight vehicles. 
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33. 
34. 
Accident/Incident 
Description 
t'1hile machining foam in-
sulation during 360° repair of 
a spacecraft forward skirt 
at a manufacturing facility, 
the rotating aluminum shaft 
of the machining tool sheared 
at the base of the phenolic 
cutting head. The cutting 
head hit and damaged the in-
sulation. 
puring manufacturing opera-
tions -involving the removal 
of a bonded support bracket 
from the forward dane of a 
spacecraft, the dome skin 
was dented in three places. 
SECTION IX 
STRUCTURAL SYSTEMS 
Causes 
Deficient work planning in 
that the machining tool 
(aluminum shaft) selected 
was inadequate for the 
assigned work. 
Personnel error in that there 
was failure to follow esta-
blished procedures when us ing 
a plastic scraper to separate 
the bond between the support 
bracket and the forward dome. 
Recommended 
Preventive/Corrective 
Action 
. Avoid the use of aluminum shafts 
in machining tools. Require 
engineering design review of 
machining tools procurement· 
specifications to ensure their 
adequacy for use with program 
essential hardware. 
Require that employees be in-
structed on proper procedures 
for removing bonded items fran 
critical flight hardware. Assure 
that the proper hand tools are 
available for employees' use when 
removing bonded articles from 
flight hardware. 
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Accident/Incident 
Descrlption 
35. During manufacturing, a 
titanium propellant tank 
loaded on an automatic con-
veyor was damaged beyond 
repair \'1hen it jammed into 
a partially open heat-treat 
oyen door due to failure of 
the door lifting mechanism. 
• 
SECTION IX 
STRUCTUHAL SYSTEMS 
Causes 
Deficient design of the heat-
treat system in that there 
was no provision for auto-
matic shut-d<xo1I1 of the con-
veyor if the oven door failed 
to less than required open 
position. Contributing was 
deficient work procedures 
since the door mechanism 
was in an incipient failure 
condition \V'hich could· have . 
been detected prior to start 
of heat-treat operations. 
Recommended 
Preventive/Corrective 
Action 
Designate all automatic feed 
operations for flight hardware 
safety critical. Require safety 
analysis/review of feed systems 
designs to ensure incorporation 
of fail-safe features. Ensure 
operating procedures require 
visual/functional check of 
proper systems operation; prior 
to start of loading 
... 
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Accident/Incident 
Description 
53. During highway transport 
of critical program equip-
ment a tractor-trailer 
interior caught fire 
approximately 5 hours 
after it was loaded. The 
local fire department ex-
tingUished the minor 
blaze. The dl-iver con-
tinued and l\ hours later 
the fire recurred, com-
·pletely destroying the 
critical equipment. Des-
truction and damage 
amounted to over $800,000. 
54. While towing a vertical en-
gine installer to its stor-
age location at a lalUlch 
facility a crack developed 
in the installer draw-bar 
assembly at an area of pre-
vious repairs. 
SECTION X 
TRANSPORT/HANDLING 
Causes 
Failure to enforee no 
smoking policies around 
packing and shipping areas 
and materials. Contribut-
ing causes were failure to 
inspect loading of high 
value equipment, careless-
ness of loading personnel, 
and failure to properly 
extinguish initial trailer 
fire •. 
Personnel error in that 
proper towing vehicle op-
erating procedures were 
not followed. Contribut-
ing was inadequate rna:i.n-
tenance procedures in 
that multiple repair of the 
failed area had been 
made, in lieu of part 
replacement, which 
weakened the fa iled part. 
Recommended 
Preventive/Corrective 
Action 
Publicize and enforce no smoking 
regulations in packing, shipping, 
and receiving areas. 
Designate handling and transport 
of essential GSE a~ safety critical 
operations; require training m d 
certification of handling per-
sonnel. Ensure that essential 
GSE parts replacement policies 
prevent multiple failure repair 
o£ the same part. 
I-' 
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Accident/Incident 
Description 
55. During preparations for ship-
ment of a propellant tank 
from the manufacturer a heat 
lamp was tipped against the 
outer tank wrapping and 
started a fire causing 
minor damage to the tank~ 
56. During maintenance work on 
a main stage crawler trans-
porter, three hydraulic 
steering pistons and re-
lated cylinders were sev-
erely damaged when the 
trtlllSporter platfonn was 
lowered. 
.. 1"1 
SECTION X 
TRANSPORT/HANDLING 
Causes 
Procedural in that heat 
lamps, though not actually 
required, were used near 
flammable materials with-
out proper protective 
devices to prevent igni-
tion. 
Inadequate work control 
in that there was no over-
all supervision or positive 
cormnmication during main-
tenance operations. Con-
tributing were personnel 
error since the required 
inspection to verify open 
position of manually op-
erated isolation valves 
was not perfonned prior 
to platfonn lowering, and 
a design deficiency in that 
there was no hydraulic 
over-pressure warning or 
relief system. 
Recommended 
Preventive/Corrective 
Action 
Require that all heat lamps 
used in presence of flammable 
materials be equipped with 
protective devices, and be 
specifically certified for 
use in each operation. 
Designate all rna intenance and 
check-out opera-tions on flight 
hardware tr~,sporter ~quipment 
as hazardous and certify per-
sonnel for such operations. 
Ensure '.:hat all maintenance 
operations on such eq~ipment 
are cOn"CrOlled by one overall 
supervi.sor. ~:?G:uire -:::1e use 
of checklis"::s and/or procedures 
dLWing ~aintenance operations. 
Equip all hydraulic sub-systems 
capable of inadvertent over-
pre'ssurization with relief 
valves or warning devices. 
..... 
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Accident/Incident 
Description 
57. During removal of an empty 
tank car, a helium rail 
car was mistakenly moved 
while a pressurized hose 
was still connected be-
tween the car and the 
off-load facility mani-
fold, resulting in damage 
to the flex hose and 
bleed panel. 
58. A cormterc ial tractor-
trailer van haul.ing a NASA.-
awned computer system 
skidded off the highway 
into an embanlonent. '1'he 
trailer jackknifed, causing 
damage to various computer 
parts. The driver received 
minor injuries.-
SECTION X 
TRANSPORT/HANDLING 
Causes 
Inadequate work control in 
that the car was moved with-
out first being checked for 
connected lines; failure 
of the off-loading crew to 
set legally required warn-
ing flags, and failtme to 
verify the identity of the 
car before moving it. Con-
tributing was poor visi-
bility due to night-time 
cmditions. 
Material failure in that an 
apparently good front tire 
of the tractor blew out 
under ideal highway and 
weather conditions. Con-
tributing were personnel 
error in that the driver 
failed to control the ve-
hicle after the blowout 
occurred, and inadequate 
procedures in that there 
was no evidence that ve-
hicle condition or driver 
qualification had been 
determined before depart-
ure • 
Recommended 
Preventive/Corrective 
Action 
Designate propellant off-
loading opersrions as hazard-
ous and certify off-load 
crews. Require safety 
approval of off-loading 
operations prior to commence-
ment. Require use of a 
checklist and/or procedures 
to ensure correct ra,ilcar 
identification and that all 
disconnects have been made 
prior to movement. 
Designate highway transporta-
tion of high value/program 
critical equipment as safety 
critical. Require certifica-
tion of drivers and inspection 
of hizhway vehicles hauling 
critical equipment prior to 
departure. 
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Accident/Incident 
Description 
59. During shipment of a number 
of space system batteries 
via convnon carrier trailer 
truck from the manufacturer 
plant to the la\D1ch center, 
the batteries were damaged 
beyond use due to exposure 
to excessive heat brought 
about by failure of the 
trailer temperature ccndi-
tioning system and failure 
of an independent tempera-
ture gage/sensor assembly. 
60. During manufacturing check-
out a wheeled leak detector 
was damaged while being 
loaded on to skid, when a 
wheel broke off caus ing 
unit to fall backwards to 
the pavement. 
.. 111 
SECTION X 
TRANSPORT/HANDLING 
Causes 
Inadequate transportation 
planning in that there were 
no procedures to verify the 
proper operaticn of the con-
diticn!ng system and its 
temperature gage system prior 
to battery loading; there 
were no procedures to ensure 
adequacy of emergency actions 
to be taken on noticing the 
failure of the temperature 
gage/sensor assembly (the 
conditioning unit was heard 
to be rtuming and it was 
asswned it was in the IIcool l1 
mode when it had actually 
failed into the "heat" mode 
due to a short circuit in 
the ttErmostat assembly). 
Material failure. The 
wheel broke off at a weld. 
ContribL"1:ing was possible 
overstressing of the wheel! 
weld due to rough handling. 
Recorrunended 
Preventive/Corrective 
Action 
Require verification by author-
ized supplier and a government 
representative of proper oper-
ation of essential trailer 
truck cmditicning systems 
prior to loading program essen-
tial equipment for transport. 
Require safety/reliability re-
view of essential trailer truck 
conditioning systems to esta-
blish compatibility between 
emergency enroute procedures 
and failure modes of condition-
ing equipment, prior to shipment 
of program equipment. 
"I 
Require training and certifica-
tion of all personne.l involved 
in handling/moving of essential 
hardware. Require regular 
maintenance inspection of wheel 
assemblies on trolley mounted 
high value/critical test and 
support equipment. Affix hand-
ling warning notices to critical 
portable equipment and ensure 
its movement only by certified 
personnel. 
...... 
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Acc1dent/Inc1dent 
Description 
61. While removing a spacecraft 
cannol unit from the mobile 
launcher to the high bay 
during the pre-launch check-
out, three calibration test 
point connections were 
broken .• 
62. NhUe equipment was being 
unloaded from a cart an 
the l20-foot level of a 
mobile launcher, a test 
box fell to the "On level 
and was totally demolished. 
No other danage or per-
sonnel injuries Occurred. 
SECTION X 
TRANSPORT/HANDLING 
Causes 
Persamel error since 
cantrol mlit was moved 
without protective pads 
or cases, in violation 
of established procedures. 
Persormel error in over-
loading the cart, inter-
mingling flex hose with 
other apparatus, and un-
loading cart while too 
close to the edge. 
Recommended 
Preventive/Corrective 
Action 
Require QC inspection and veri-
fication of proper packag~ 
protection of high value test 
equipment prior to movement. 
Establish procedures and con-
trols to prevent over-loading 
and hazaroous handling of 
carts. Require that personnel 
handling movable carts around 
and on launch supgort struct-
ures be properly trained and 
certified for their jobs. Pro-
vide protective side barriers 
or nets on carts. Require cart 
loads to be secured by nets or 
other arresting methods before 
bein~ moved across catwalks. 
Specify and enforce safe load 
limits for equipment carts • 
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. Accident/Inc1dent 
Descr1ption 
63 •. During the moving of test 
equipment on a cart across 
a can"alk, a S-lb. test box . 
fell from the cart over 100' 
to·a lower level and was 
demolished~ No personnel 
injuries or other equipment 
damage resulted. 
6lJ. During facility modifica-
tion, a 190-lb. steel heat 
shield panel was be ing 
hoisted by~n overhead 
crane Nhen the handling 
tool attached to the panel 
failed and the panel fell 
against a space vehicle 
engine, damaging lJ. lines 
beyond repair. 
. ,. 
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SECTION X 
TRANSPORT/HANDLING. 
Causes· 
Personnel error in that 
the cart \l1as overloaded 
with loose, unsecured 
equipment. Contributing 
t-Jere failure to exercise 
proper supervision and 
to provide side fencing 
or netting on catwalk. 
Procedural error in that 
a handling tool not de~ 
signed for the specific 
job Nas Used. There was 
no tool for lifting the· 
steel panel so one used . 
for lighte~r ceramic panels 
was utilized. Contribut-
ing causes were failure to 
provide formal authoriza-
ti.on of lift ing tool sub-
stitution, failure to 
provide instructions on 
lifting tool limitations, 
failure to require safety 
L'1spection of the lift 
rigging, and failure to·· 
provide support for the· 
shield while taking up 
cable slack.· ... 
: . 
.. 
Recormnended 
Preventive/Corrective 
Action 
Establish procedures and con-
trols to prevent over-loading 
and hazardous handling of 
carts. Require that personnel 
handling movable carts arOlmd 
and on launch sup?ort struct-
ures be properly trained and 
certified for their jobs. Pro-
vide protective side barriers 
or nets on carts. Require cart 
loads to be secured by nets or 
other arresting methods before 
bein~ moved across can.za.lks. 
SIlg-cgy and tmfg:rc~ ~ilft: :Leild 
limits for equipment cart!. 
Require safety approval and . 
surveillance of facility modi-
fication hoisting operations in 
vicinity of flight systems; re-
quire inspection of all rigging 
prior to use. Establish pro-
cedures \o:hich restrict tool use 
to the jo!:J for \I1hich designed . 
and require formal approval of 
any substitution.. Require list-
lllg of proper tool use and any 
limitations on tool dra,,,ings. 
and ensure that personnel engaged 
in critical lifting operations 
are at'lare of this information. 
,I,' 
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Accident/Inc1dent 
_~scription 
65. Two workmen inhaled toxic 
fumes generated by 
smouldering containers 
of oil, acid and solvent 
which spontaneously ig-
nited at a test facility 
dtmlp, due to incompati-
bility between materials 
be:ing dumped. 
66. During local truck trans-
port of a spacecraft cap-
sule at a Center, the 
capsule caught on and 
broke a fire alarm com-
munications cable over 
the roadway, resulting in 
minor damage to 5 private 
vehicles parked nearby. 
Negligible damage to the 
capsule. 
SECTION X 
TRANSPORT/HANDLING 
Causes 
Inadequate work planning 
and procedures in that the 
disposal operations did not 
provide for the identifica-
tion and segregation of 
potentially hazardous ma-
terial combinations. 
Inadequate transportation 
planning in that overhead 
clearances along the route 
were not verified before-
hand. 
Recommended 
Preventive/Corrective 
Action 
Require identification and 
segregation of hazardous ma-
terials comb inat ions in plan-
ning disposal procedures. En-
sure that disposal personnel 
are adequately briefed on the 
potential hazards of waste 
materials and on the necessity 
for wearing protective gear. 
Require route inspection and 
verification of adequate over-
head road clearance in planning 
transport of flight equipment. 
'-, 
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Accident/Incident 
Description 
67. During airport gro\.Uld 
handling operations, a 
crate~ pallet mounted, 
spacecraft oxygen tank 
being shipped from the 
manufacturer slipped 
off a transporter and 
fell 3 feet to the ground. 
There was no damage to 
the tank and only minor 
damage to the reusable 
container. 
68. While a workstand section 
was being moved during 
assembly of a spacecraft 
module, a wheel on the 
workstand caught on B 
floor joint, causing the 
workstand to pivot and 
strike the module propul-
sion system radiator. 
. ~ 
SECTION X 
TRANSPORT/HANDLING 
Causes 
Personnel error in that the 
transporter operator had 
installed only 2 of 6 chocks 
designed to prevent load 
slippage. Contributing was 
failure to mark the container 
as critical flight hardware 
and failure to notify the 
shipper of the critical 
nature of the cargo. 
Inadequate work control in 
that the workstand was being. 
moved with the help of an 
electric work saver and there 
were no restraints employed 
to prevent erratic movement 
of the workstand. 
Reconunended 
Preventive/Corrective 
Action 
Clearly mark all shipments of 
critical flight hardware as 
flight critical an the con-
tainer and include special 
handling instructions. En-
sure that shippers are notified 
of flight critical shipments. 
Prohibit use of assisting equip. 
ment which cannot be controlled 
with required precision. Require 
strategic placement of adequate 
restraints to prevent erratic 
movement of workstands during 
their movement around flight 
hardware. 
..... 
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Accident/Incident 
Description 
\'lhile moving a spacecraft 
module control \mit, a 
forklift went over a bump; 
unit bounced, breaking the 
pallet and fell 2-3 feet 
to the pavement, then 
roll~ 5 feet in front of 
the forklift, resulting 
in damage to the unit. 
During off-loading of a 
crated vehicle stage helium 
ambient sphere by forklift 
from a truck, the sphere 
crate was dropped due to 
imbalance and insecurity on 
the forklift , resulting in 
loss of the sphere for pro-
duction use. 
SECTION X 
TRANSPORT/HANDLING 
Causes 
Inadequate work control in 
that the movement of the 
\mit was undertaken without 
proper secur ing to. the 
pallet and forklift. 
Personnel error in that the 
operator apparently misjudged 
the balance of the crate as 
it was being lifted and possi-
bly did not use long enough 
forks. Contributing causes 
were failure to use straps 
or restraining devices while 
handling flight critical 
hardware, failure to clearly 
mark the shipment as critical 
hardware and to inform the 
shipper, and failure to 
properly supervise unload-
ing of critical equipment. 
Recommended 
Preventive/Corrective 
Action 
Require that forklift trans-
port procedures on critical! 
high value spacecraft hard-
ware include the equipment 
for tie-down before movement. 
Require all forklift opera-
tors handling such items to 
be certified. 
Ensure that all critical pro-
gram hardware shipments are 
clearly marked on the crate as 
critical equipment. Require 
crated critical equipment to 
be clearly marked with CG loca-
tions and lifting points. Re-
quire personnel involved in 
handling critical equipment to 
be trained and certified for 
their job. Ensure adequacy of 
supervisory control during fork-
lift handling of critical equip-
ment to ensure use of correct 
fork lengths and attention to 
load ba.lance • 
~ 
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Accident/Incident 
Description 
71. During installation of an 
ascent stage in a work-
stand, one of four hydraulic 
lifting jacks failed due to 
hydraulic leak allowing the 
corner of the stage to drop 
approximately one inch. 
There were no personnel 
injuries or flight equip-
ment damage. 
72. While transporting 4 drums 
on a pallet in a manufactur-
ing receiving area, a fork-
lift struck and broke one 
corner of a fiberglass con-
tainer placed in the passage-
way and slightly damaged 
spacecra.ft Control and 
Display Panel inside. There 
were no injuries. 
• 
SECTION X 
TRANSPORT/HANDLING 
Causes 
Procedural deficiency in 
the selection of the jacks 
used in that they were 
prone to sudden failure 
due to hydraulic leak. 
Contributing was inade-
quate work control in 
that the rrrocedural re-
quirement to position the 
jack ram locking ring to 
limit any stage drop to 
1/8 inch was not complied 
with. 
Deficient receiving area 
procedures which failed to 
provide for adequate pro-
tection of in-transit pro-
gram essential equipment. 
Reconunended 
Preventive/Corrective 
Action 
Prohibit use of margina1/ 
deficient handling/positioning 
gear in movement of essent ial 
program equipment. Identify 
such gear as safety critical 
and establish formal design! 
engineering control for pro-
curement and selection. Re-
quire supervisory review of 
handling/positioning procedures 
with handling team prior to 
movement of essential equipment; 
maintain supervisory control 
during movement operation. 
Require periodic (at least 
quarterly) safety reviews/ 
surveillance of receiving 
area/warehouse procedures and 
activities to ensure segrega-
tion of fragile material not 
requiring mechanized handling 
equipment from heavy bulky 
material; to ensure adequate 
passageways are provided for 
transit of handling equipment. 
~ 
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Accident/Incident 
Description 
73. \'fulle lifting a spacecraft 
hydraulic accumulator from 
its shipping container, the 
heavy end slipped from the 
mechanic's grasp and fell 
6 to B inches. damaging an 
electrical connector attached 
to a potentiometer within 
the reservoir. 
74. During a helilUtl transfer 
operation, the truck driver 
attempted to move the tube 
trailer, while it was still 
connected to the supply sys-
tem, resulting in damage to 
the high pressure flex hose, 
the system manifold, the line 
leading away from the parking 
area, and the tra iler dis-
charge manifold. 
SECTION X 
TRANSPORT/HANDLING 
Causes 
Personnel error due to im-
proper handling. Contribu-
ting was failure by super-
vision to detennine the 
adequacy of methods and 
protection being used while 
remov ins the accumulator 
from its shipping container. 
Inadequate work control in 
that the trailer was re-
connected to the system 
for leak checks, after it 
was called to be moved by 
the test support crew, and 
the driver on arrival was 
not so informed.. Contri-
buting was persOllJ1l!l error 
since the driver did not 
visually determine that 
trailer was disconnected • 
Reconunended 
Preventive/Corrective 
Action 
Require that unpacking pro-
cedures for items of flight 
hardware and components in-
clude a. step for supervision! 
inspection determination as 
to the need for use of any 
special handling or protect-
ive measures, prior to pro-
ceeding with unpacking opera-
tions. 
Require that warning or caution 
signs/flags be placed on front 
and rear of trailers while 
connected to a transfer mani-
fold, and permit removal only 
after the joint inspection by 
both the truck driver and 
the supervisor of the supply 
system. 
..... 
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Accident/Incident 
Description 
75. While slow towing a helium 
rail car, a trackmobile de-
railed, damaging a mechani-
cal track switch and sus-
taining minor structural 
damage. The switch had to 
be replaced. 
76. During installation of port-
able clean roans in a test 
tower, a hoist cable caught 
the reflector of a fluores-
cent light fixture, pulling 
loose the reflector and two 
48-inch lamps. The lamps 
broke, scattering glass an 
a space vehicle. There was 
potential for mercury con-
tamination of the vehicle. 
SECTION X 
TRANSPORT/HANDLING 
Causes 
Inadequate design of the con-
trol levers since all three 
were the same color, only 
l~" apart, and were not 
equipped with a positive 
safety lock to prevent in-
advertent movement. Con-
tributing was personnel 
error in that the rubber 
wheels were placed in the 
"down n pos ition erroneously, 
thereby disengaging the 
flanged track wheels. 
Fa ilure to follow required 
procedures in that workmen 
did not adequately monitor 
cable clearance during op-
erations. . Contributing 
was failure to provide pro-
tection for the space ve-
hicle during hoisting op-
erations. 
Reconunended 
Preventive/Corrective 
Action 
Require human factors/safety 
review/analysis of manual 
control systems designs during 
their development to ensure 
man/machine compatibility; 
provide safety locks on manual 
control levers. Require train-
ing and certification of trans-
port/handling personnel. 
Designate all hoisting and low-
ering operations near flight 
systems as safety critical and 
require safety inspection of 
rigging and system protection . 
prior to conmencing operaticas., 
Ensure that safety training and 
awareness programs positively 
emphasize the critical nature 
of hoisting/handling operations 
on or near flight hardware. 
.. 
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77. 
78. 
.. 
Accident/Incident 
Description 
During inspection of an 
instrumentation flight 
module after removal from 
storage, two indentations 
in the exterior s,tructure 
were found. The damage 
was minor. 
During stage rotation from 
vertical to horizontal 
position in preparation 
for shipment from the manu-
facturing f;.cility, the 
protective cover of the 
stage feed line contacted 
the upper structure of a 
nearby forklift, resulting 
in minor damage to the 
cover. 
SECTION X 
TRANSPORT/HANDLING 
Causes 
Improper storage and handl ing . 
techniques in that the module 
was apparently stored with in-
sufficient clearance between 
the unit and the storage sta-
tion post, which cause~ a 
gather in the dust cover to 
be pressed into the side of 
the unit. Contributing was 
personnel error in not ex-
ercis ing due care in storage 
operations. 
Inadequate work control in that 
sufficient clearance for the 
stage rotation path was not 
established prior to movement. 
RecoliUllended 
Preventive/Corrective 
Action 
Require formal storage pro-
cedures and specifications 
for critical end items. Re-
quire OC inspection to ensure 
that critical end items are 
stored in accordance with 
~pecifications. 
Ensure that r.10Ve conductors ex'" 
ercise rigid control of area 
operations during movementl 
repositioning of flight ve-
hicles. Require barricad-
ing placardin~ of area opera-
~ions ~rior to start of move. 
. , 
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Accident/Incident 
~ Aescription 
79. During transporter move-
ment of spacecraft sub-
assemblies within a plant, 
the transporter struck the 
top of a doorway, causing 
minor damage to the sub-
assemblies. 
80. During removal of a dy'lla-
mic test article from 
manufacturing checkout 
facility building, the 
mobile crane handlil1.~ the 
aft end of the unit was 
overloaded, causing the 
front (tractor) end 0:: 
the crane to rise off the 
ground and permitting 
several feet of Wlcontrolled 
movement of the flight unit. 
No damage or personnel in-
juries occurred. However, 
accident/injury potential 
was high. 
SECTION X 
TRANSPORT/HANDLING 
Causes 
Personnel error in that the 
driver did not make a visual 
check prior to driving 
through the doorway. 
Inadequate functional veri-
fication procedures for 
verifying the safe opera-
tion of the crane, which 
failed to consider the 
effect of motion on the 
crane's carrying capacity. 
Verification under load had 
been performed only under 
stationary conditions. 
Recorrunended 
Preventive/Corrective 
Action 
Require full stop visual check 
for adequate clearance when 
moving flight hardware and pro-
gram equipment through doorways. 
Provide clearance caution and 
warning placaro.s on doors and 
exits used by plant transport 
vehicles. 
Ensure that procedures for all 
moving of critical flight hard-
ware include requirements for 
pre-use fWlctional certification 
of transporting equipment both 
under load and motion conditions. 
Require periodic review and cer-
tification of preparation and 
readiness procedures associated 
with "critical move" operatioos. 
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Accident/Incident 
Description 
81. During receiving inspect-
ian at a NASA Center, a 
~ission module was found 
to have a high level of 
radiological contamina-
tion. Although no damage 
or injuries resulted from 
this incident, a similar 
situation could result in 
a serious accident. 
82. During Highway transport, 
a cargo of high-value 
electronic equipment broke 
loose from the tie-down 
ropes aboard a truck and 
the equipment fell over 
onto the bed of the truck 
and some on to the side 
of the road. Two fuse 
distribution racks were 
destroyed. 
SECTION X 
TRANSPORT/HANDLING 
Causes 
An unauthorized modification, 
in that maintenance personnel 
replaced the l/ll" thick plas-
tic shield on the instrumenta-
tion panel with a 1/16" thick 
shield which warped and, dur-
ing transport:, vibrated enough 
to rub radioactive paint off 
the panel. Contributing \>las 
an inspection deficiency in 
that the shipment was not 
inspected and approved by 
the Radiological Safety 
Officer prior to dispatch. 
Procedural error.s by both the 
trucker and the shipper. 
Trucking operator did not 
comply with procedures for 
proper tie-down and protec-
tionof high-value/program-
critical equipment while in 
transit, and the shipper 
did not notify the trucker 
that the load to be trans-
ported was high-value/ 
critical, as required. Con-
tributing cause was material 
failure in that the tie-down 
rope broke, because it was 
worn and not of required 
working strength. 
Reconunended 
Preventive/Corrective 
Action 
Prohibit substitution of non-
standard materials in all 
critical hardware or flight 
equipment without prior approv-
al. Require engineerin~ hazard 
analysis prior to approving 
such material substitutions. 
Ensure that all radioactive 
shipments are labeled as haz-
ardous and require inspection. 
and approval by Radiological 
Safety Officer. 
Require formal safety inspection 
of all packing and loading opera-
tions involving high-value! 
critical end-item hardware. Re-
quire safety inspection of all 
trucks and certification of all 
drivers included in transport 
of high-value/critical end item 
hardware. Ensure that truckers 
are notified and aware of those 
shipments which contain high-
value/critical. end item hardware. 
Require safety inspection and 
verification of adeql.iac~1 of tie-
down ropes and cables. 
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84. 
Accident/Incident 
Description 
During movement and pos i-
tioning of a stage trans-
porter at a manu:facturing 
facility, the driver backed 
the equipment into a 
stanchion, damaging the 
access ladder to the forward 
truck steering cab. 
\'lliile guiding a hydraset to 
the floor in a manufacturing 
and assembly facility, employ-
ee's finger was caught between 
the load and the floor, result-
ing in the loss of l-l/l~ fT of 
finger. 
~tI 
SECTION X 
TRANSPORT/HANDLING 
Causes 
Inadequate work control in 
that procedures requiring 
stanchion removal prior to 
moving vehicle were not 
followed and communications 
were relayed by both observ-
er and superv isor, caus ing 
driver misunderstanding. 
Inadequate work control since 
the load was set down before 
ascertaining that the indi-
vidual guiding the operation 
was clear and ready for load's 
contact with the floor. 
Reconunended 
Preventive/Corrective 
Action 
Require checklist verification 
by move conductor or supervisor 
that all pre-move procedures 
have been followed prior to 
moving transporter or major end 
item hardware. Require one 
observer for each side during 
transporter movement and enSl~e 
that only one person relays 
instructions to driver. 
Require that procedures for low-
ering and hoisting operations be 
periodically reviewed to assure 
they are adequate for current 
operations. Ensure that super-
V1S1on is adequate and present 
during such operations. 
.. 
t--' 
l'\) 
\J1 
t 
Accident/mcident 
Description 
41 
85. While being transported 
from storage on a flat 
four-wheeled dolly, B 
VHF ranging console fell 
off when a dolly wheel 
slipped into a crevice 
at the entrance of an ele-
vator, resulting in minor 
damage to the console, 
and injury (broken leg) 
to one employee. Exten-
sive checkout testing 
had to be performed on 
the console. 
86. During assembly of a 
thermal systems unit 
('l'SU) t a cable assembly 
in the rigging hoistblg 
tool failed when a swaged 
cable loop pulled loose t 
dropp,iJig the TSU carmister 
lJ. feet to the floor, 
caus ing minor structural 
damage. No personnel 
injuries. 
SECTION X 
TRANSPORT/HANDLING 
Causes 
Inadequate pr~edures for 
handling and transporting 
high value equipment in that 
the load was not secured, 
the skid roller dolly was 
not an approved piece of 
equipment for transport of 
high value equipment, and 
clearance space between 
elevator and floor was not 
properly bridged. 
Material failure in that a 
swaged cable connection which 
had been properly proof tested 
8 weeks earlier suddenly 
failed under load. Contribut-
ing causes were possible im-
proper distribution of the 
load and possible contamina-
tion of the cable sleeve 
with lubrioant from the wire 
cable. 
I' 
Reconunended 
Preventive/Corrective 
Action 
Require that transport equipment 
be certified and approved for 
transport of critical hardware 
items and ensure periodic re-
inspection. Require that formal 
procedures and checklists be 
utilized in movement of any 
critical hardware. 
Avoid the use of swaged cable 
connection in hoisting assemblies 
UBed for moving critical hardware. 
Require all such assemblies be 
designed with U-bolt wire rope 
clips for the cables. Establish 
procedures for safety inspection 
to verify proper condition of 
hoisting tools prior to each use. 
Determine CG for each load prior 
to lift and adjust rigs accordingly.' 
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Accident/Incident 
Description 
87. During rece1V1llg operations. 
a vacuum pumping unit was 
being removed by forklift 
from a truck when the unit 
suddenly tipped toward and 
struck the truck bed, re-
sulting in extensive ex-
ternal and internal damage 
to the unit. 
88. During manufacturing, a 
launch vehicle digital 
computer page assembly 
was inadvertently dropped 
while being hand-carried 
in a process laboratory, 
resulting in minor damage 
to the assembly and a 
non-flightworthy dis-
position. 
·1 
SECTION X 
TRANSPORT/HANDLING 
Causes 
The primary cause was in-
adequate handling techniques 
in that the forklift opera-
tor used forks which did not 
extend the full width of the 
shipping pallet and failed 
to detect the resulting load 
imbalance. Contribut ing 
causes were failure to mark 
the shipment as critical equip-
ment amI lack of superv is ion 
of critical handling operations. 
The primary cause was in-
adequate handling techniques 
in that flight critical hard-
ware l'18S not protected from 
inadvertent damage during 
transport/handling. Con-
tributing causes were fail-
ure to designate the page 
assembly as flight critical, 
and failure to inform per-
sonnel that the assembly was 
for flight use. 
Recommended 
Preventive/Corrective 
Action 
Designate critical progra~ 
equipment handling operations 
as safety critical and require 
training and certification of 
personnel. Require all pro-
gram critical equipment to be 
clearly marked as sucn for 
shipment and ensure that such 
shipments are marked with CG 
locations and lifting points. 
Ensure adequacy of super-
visory control during fork-
lift handling of essential 
equipment, to ensure nse of 
correct fork lengths and atten-
tion to load balance. 
Require positive protection of 
program critical hardware dur-
ing transport!handling in 
process laboratories/facilities; 
require use of padded carts 
in lieu of handcarry between 
process stat ions; minimize 
manual handling; ensure that 
critical hardware is identi-
fied as such. 
.. 
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AccIdent/Incident 
Description 
89. During manufacturing 
handling operations, 
the cover of a container 
holding a thin-walled 
spacecraft He tank hit 
the tank when a workman 
dropped it into the 
supposedly empty con-
tainer. There was no 
damage. 
90. During the handling of a 
stage tank assembly, the 
forward and aft tank domes 
were damaged slightly by 
the tank handling rings. 
91. During shipp ing prepara-
tion operations, out-
gassed hydrogen/oxygen 
from a recently discharged 
silver/zinc battery in a 
hermetically sealed drum 
was ignited by a spark 
generated by the scraping 
of the battery against the 
side of the drum and ex-
ploded, blowing the lid 
from the drum, charring 
dessicant bags within the 
drum, and causing minor 
injury to one person. 
SECTION X 
TRANSPORT/HANDLING 
Causes 
Personnel error in that no 
visual check of the shipping 
container content was made 
before dropping in the cover. 
Contributing was lack of ex-
ternal markings indicating 
critical and fragile nature 
of contents. 
Inadequate maintenance and 
inspection of handling 
equipment since the heads 
of the screws \\lhich attach 
the rubber protective pads 
to the handling rings had 
surfaced through the pads 
and caused the scratches. 
Inadequate handling/trans-
portation/storage techniques 
in that the battery was placed 
:in the drum too soon after 
discharge; (it is char'acter-
istic 0: silver/zinc battel'ies 
to out gas bot;. hydrof';cll anc 
oxygen for several hours afte::..' 
dischar~e). Also, trle Latter',',' 
was not secured inside the 
container. 
" 
Recommended 
Preventive/Corrective 
Action 
Designate critical end -item 
handling and transport opera-
tions as safety critical and 
require all personnel involved 
to be trained and certified. 
Require visual verification of 
contents prior to mov ing or 
insert ing anything into equip-
ment containers. 
Ensure adequate maintenance of 
specialized equipment used with 
flight hardware, and require a 
pre-use inspection. 
Ensure silver/zinc battery ship-
ment procedures require a delay 
of not less than '+8 hours after 
discharge before sealing in 
s:1ippir.~ container. Require 
batteries to be secured inside 
S;:iDpinf containers. 
...... 
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Accident/Incident 
Description 
92. During transport opera-
tions a parked, tm-
attended tractor-trailer 
rig containing high 
value flight support 
equipment rolled down-
grade thro~, a fence, 
causing minor damage 
to the rig, but no 
damage to the cargo • 
'I' ~ 
I, 
SECTION X 
TRANSPORT/HANDLING 
Causes 
Personnel errOl' :in that the 
driver failed to secure the 
parked vehicle in accordance 
with approved procedures. 
Recommended 
Preventive/Corrective 
Action 
Require use of a checkl.ist 
for operation and parking of 
transport vehdcles containing 
program criticallhigh-value 
hardware, and establish a 
safety training and awareness 
program for drivers to motivate 
canpliance. 
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ACE 
ASI . 
ASME 
CG 
C02 
CRS 
DB 
ECS 
EO 
GH2 
GN...2 
GSc 
He 
Hz 
KOH 
LH2 
LN2 
LOX. 
N20 4 
LUT 
2tp 
PSI 
PSIA 
PSIG 
QC 
QD 
Q&RA 
RCS 
R&D 
. RF 
RPM 
SCAPE 
SCFM 
TC 
TCD 
TCP 
TPS 
TPI 
TV 
TVD 
UDMH 
VDC 
APPENDIX 
GLOSSARY OF 
ABBREVIATIONS, ACRONYMS AND TERMS 
Automatic Checkout Equipment 
Apollo Standard Initiator 
American Society of Mechanical Engineers 
Center of Gravity 
Carbon Dioxide 
Cold Rolled Steel 
Design Burst 
Environmental Control System 
Engineering Order 
Gaseous Hydrogen 
Gaseous Nitrogen 
Ground Support Equipment 
Helium 
Hertz (cps) 
Potassium Hydroxide 
Liquid Hydrogen 
Liquid Nitrogen 
Liquid Oxygen 
Nitrogen Tetroxide 
Launcher Umbilical Tower 
Oxygen 
Operational Checkout Procedure 
Pounds Per Square Inch 
Pounds Per Square Inch Absolute 
Pounds Per Square Inch Gauge 
Quality Control 
Quick Disconnect 
Quality and Reliability Assurance 
Reaction Control System 
Research and Development 
Radio Frequency 
Revolutions Per Minute 
Self Contained Atmospheric Protective Ensemble 
Standard Cubic Feet Per Minute 
T est Control/Test Con9uctor 
Test Checkout Directive 
Test Checkout Procedure 
Test Preparation Sheet 
Threads Per Inch 
Television 
Toxic Vapor Disposal . 
Unsymmetrical Dimethylhydrazine 
Volts, Direct Current 
129. 
APPENDIX (CONTINUED) 
Accident 
Incident 
Cryogenics 
"0" Water 
Dewar 
Hardware -
Software 
"Hoke" Bottle 
"K" Bottle 
"Kluge" 
Program Phase 
Program Activities-
A type A or B mishap as defined in the NASA 
Safety Manual, NHB 1700.1 (VI) 
A mishap of less than accident severity as 
defined in the NASA Safety Manual, 
NHB 1700.1 (VI) 
The science of producing and the application 
of low temperature processes below minus 
1500 F and the techniques involving handling, 
storage and usage of liquified gases. Examples 
are hydrogen, oxygen and heli um. 
Distil/ed water. 
A double walled metal vessel or tank, with 
an evacuated space between walls, used for 
storing fuels and propellants in a liquid state. 
Any program component, subsystem, system, 
module, stage or vehicle, plus any facility 
equi pment and property, ground support 
equipment (GSE) and other used in direct support 
of program hardware. 
Any formalized written policy, directive, 
procedure, plan, specification, requirement or 
analysis prepared as an essential tool in the 
conduct of program activities. 
A sma" pressure vessel or container used in 
obtaining, handling and transporting gases 
and liquids for sampling ~ 
A portable pressure cylinder or t<:Jrlk commonly 
used as a pressurEl source. 
A frequ-entTy LJSedsTang -terndor a temporary or 
unauthorized installation. 
The four phases of a major research and development/ 
operations program as defined in the NASA Phased 
Project Planning Guidelines, NHB 7121.2, August 
1968 Edition. 
Tasks, work, functions and responsibilities associated 
with program hardware development/operations as 
defined in NASA Phased Project Planning Guidelin~s, 
NHB 7121. 2, August 1968 Edition. 
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